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When a client or a third party tells defense counsel about the existence
of physical evidence that may implicate his client in a crime,I counsel has
several choices open to him. First, he may ignore the information. Second,
counsel may take possession of the evidence and may then either retain it,
1. The subject of disclosure of incriminating evidence received from a client has
been the subject of theoretical treatment in several legal periodicals. See generally
Abramovsky, Confidentiality: The Future Crime - Contraband Dilemmas, 85 v. VA. L.
REV. 929, 937-41 (1983); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Hear No Evil, See No Evil,
Speak No Evil?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 921, 921-36 (1983); Bender, Incriminating Evidence:
What to do With aHot Potato, 11 COLO. LAWYER 881, 881-95 (1982); Comment, Disclosure
of IncriminatingPhysical Evidence Receivedfrom a Client: The Defense Attorney s Dilemma,
52 U. COLO. L. REv. 419,419-63 (1981); Comment, Ethics, Law andLoyalty: ThbAttorney's
Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REV. 977, 977-99 (1980)
[hereinafter referred to as Ethics, Law and Loyalty]; Comment, The Problem of an Attorney
in Possession of Evidence Incriminating His Client: The Needfor a Predictable Standard, 47
U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 431-43 (1978); Comment, The Right ofa Criminal DefenseAttorney to
Withhold Physical Evidence Received from His Client, 38 U. CHIC. L. REV. 211, 211-29(1970); Comment, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can an Attorney Serve Two
Masters, 54 VA. L. REV. 145, 145-93 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Serving Two Masters];
Comment, An Attorney in Possession of Evidence Incriminating His Client, 25 WASH. AND
LEE L. REV. 133, 133-41 (1968); Comment, Fruits oftheAttorney-Client Privilege: Incrimi-
natingPhysicalEvidence and Conflicting Duties, 3 DUQ. L. REV. 239,239-50 (1965).
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turn it over to law enforcement officials, or return the evidence to where it
was found. Finally, defense counsel may have another person examine the
evidence without removing or altering it. Depending on the choice that is
made, defense counsel may commit malpractice and may also violate the
client's constitutional rights, a criminal statute, or a Rule of Professional
Conduct.
A defense attorney who ignores the existence of evidence risks a disci-
plinary action by the bar, a malpractice action by his client, and an inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim on appeal if his client is convicted.
Defense counsel cannot fulfill his ethical duty to represent his client zeal-
ously and competently without a thorough investigation of the case. If the
client is convicted because counsel failed to introduce available evidence
or was unable to deal effectively with prosecution evidence at trial, coun-
sel may be liable for malpractice and may be the subject of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
Should counsel take and retain possession of the evidence, he risks
criminal prosecution and disciplinary action. He may be prosecuted for
concealment of evidence, conspiracy to obstruct justice, being an acces-
sory after the fact, withholding information, or practicing deceit on the
court. If the evidence is the proceeds of a crime, an attorney may be prose-
cuted for receipt of stolen property. Furthermore, an attorney who, with-
out just cause, fails to comply with a subpoena duces tecum or order for
production of evidence may be prosecuted for contempt of court. Under
any of these circumstances, counsel may be disciplined for failure to obey
the law and for suppression of evidence.
An attorney who takes possession of the evidence, examines it or has it
tested, and then turns it over to law enforcement officials, may violate the
client's constitutional rights, commit malpractice, and be subject to a dis-
ciplinary action. If the attorney learns about the evidence from the client,
and the client could assert his privilege against self-incrimination in re-
sponse to a subpoena duces tecum for the evidence, the attorney violates
his duty of confidentiality to the client and deprives his client of fifth
amendment protection. If the attorney or his investigator is compelled to
testify about the prior location or condition of the evidence, and the client
is convicted because the evidence had been turned over to the prosecu-
tion, the attorney may violate the client's right to effective assistance of
counsel and commit malpractice. The attorney also may violate his ethical
duty of confidentiality to his client.
When a California attorney takes possession of the evidence, examines
or tests it, and returns it to where it was found, he will subsequently be re-
quired either to stipulate to or testify about its original location and condi-
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tion. Under the People v. Meredith2 exception to the attorney-client
privilege, California attorneys are required to turn over and provide infor-
mation about the location or original condition of the evidence if they
have deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to discover the evidence.
If this evidence is a substantial factor resulting in the client's conviction,
the attorney may have committed malpractice and provided ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The purpose of this article is to provide California attorneys and judges
with an analysis of the evidentiary, constitutional, criminal, and ethical
law applicable to implicating evidence situations. Initially, this article will
discuss the aspects of attorney-client privilege law pertaining to implicat-
ing evidence and the manner in which courts have balanced the interest in
attorney-client confidentiality against the interest of the administration
of justice in the production of evidence. The constitutional ramifications
of an attorney's handling of implicating evidence will also be discussed,
focusing on a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, his privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and the protection that the attorney-client
privilege affords these rights. Action taken by attorneys in dealing with
implicating evidence will be analyzed to determine whether the attorney's
conduct constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel or malpractice under
present law. This article additionally will focus on crimes that an attorney
may commit when dealing with implicating evidence, emphasizing the
crimes of destruction or concealment of evidence. Finally, an attorney's
conflicting ethical duties in dealing with implicating evidence and situa-
tions in which the attorney may be ethically required to withdraw from
representing the client will be examined.
In dealing with incriminating evidence, this article will suggest that the
attorney direct his investigator to examine the evidence without removing
or altering it, and then report to the attorney. The attorney and the client
should discuss the advantages and disadvantages of removing the evi-
dence for testing..If it is likely the results of the testing will exculpate the
client, the evidence should be removed, tested, and then delivered to the
prosecution. If it is unlikely or unclear that testing the evidence will excul-
pate the client, then defense counsel should leave the evidence alone. If the
prosecution subsequently discovers and takes possession of the evidence,
the defense can obtain the item for examination or testing through crimi-
nal discovery procedures.3
2. 29 Cal. 3d 682,631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612(1981).
3. Criminal defendants in California have extensive discovery rights. A defendant
has the right to inspect and have tested physical objects relevant to the case both in the pos-
session of the prosecution or anothergovernmental agency. Engstrom v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. App. 3d 240,97 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1971); Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133,343 P.2d 139 (1959) (photographs used for identification); Ross v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal.
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By following this approach the attorney will not violate the client's con-
stitutional rights, or commit ethical or criminal violations. He will not de-
prive the client of his privilege against self-incrimination because the
client participates in the decision to remove the evidence and to turn it
over to the prosecution. The client receives effective assistance of counsel,
and the attorney fulfills his ethical duty to represent his client compe-
tently. The attorney does not commit malpractice and does not breach his
ethical duty of confidentiality because the client consents to the delivery
of the evidence to the prosecution. The attorney also does not violate his
ethical duty not to suppress evidence, nor is the attorney guilty of crimes
relating to the concealment of evidence.
In the conclusion, this article will make specific recommendations for
advice to clients and third parties who inform attorneys about implicating
evidence or who bring the evidence to an attorney's office. A procedure
for dealing with implicating evidence by an attorney's receptionist or in-
vestigator is suggested. Finally, a course of action is proposed for the at-
torney who has taken possession of the evidence without realizing that
case law requires him to turn the evidence over to the prosecution.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Most courts have analyzed the implicating evidence problem as a ques-
tion of attorney-client privilege.4 When the client communicates to the at-
torney in the course of the attorney-client relationship with the intent that
the communication be confidential, the client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the confidential communication.5 This privilege applies only
App. 3d 575, 122 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1975) (all information dealing with the identity of a con-
trolled substance). When the state has conducted a test which the defense cannot duplicate,
the defendant is entitled to a copy of the prosecution expert's report. Walker v. Superior
Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 141, 317 P.2d 130,135 (1957).
4. State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1964); see Meredith,29 Cal. 3d at 683-
95, 631 P.2d at 48-54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 614-21; Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1207-12(Alaska 1978); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514,526-27,83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722-23 (1970);
State v. Douglass, 220 W. Va. 770, 783 (1882). The fruits, instrumentalities, and other evi-
dence of a crime are not protected under the work product doctrine. Material that is not de-
rived from the preparation of the defense, such as objects which are admissible into
evidence or the identity or location of evidence, are not considered work product. 2 B. JEF-
FERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCH BOOK §41.1-2,1475 (2d ed. 1982). Workproduct,
which is any "writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
research or theories" is absolutely protected. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(b), (g). While
the part of an investigator's report summarizing a witness' statement is not conditionally
protected, other parts of the report assessing the usefulness of the witness and the issues
about which the witness could testify, and the fact that the witness had been subpoenaed,
are conditionally protected. The test of the privilege is the content and the policies underly-
ing the work product doctrine, not the intent of the investigator or attorney. People v. Col-
lie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 58-61,634 P.2d 534,543-44, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458,467-68 (1981).
5. Gonzales v. Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475,479
(1977). For example, the transmission of information from the client to the attorney about
physical evidence relating to a past crime, and the attorney's advice, if not illegal, about
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when the client, attorney, or their agent is testifying in ajudicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative proceeding.6 It applies to communications relating
to past crimes.7 The privilege belongs to the client, but can be waived by
the client or by the attorney with the client's authorization.' When the ap-
plicability of the privilege is unclear, the attorney has a legal and ethical
duty to assert the privilege and if necessary, to appeal an adverse ruling.'
An exception to the attorney-client privilege exists, however, for commu-
nications pertaining to the planning or execution of future crimes, such as
the destruction or concealment of evidence.10 The "interests of publicjus-
tice further require that no shield such as the protection afforded to com-
munications between attorney and client shall be interposed to protect a
what to do with the physical evidence, are confidential communications. A confidential
communication is defined as:
[I]nformation transmitted between a client and his lawyer in the course of that rela-
tionship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses
the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the
interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes ... the advice given by the
lawyer in the course of that relationship.
CAL. EVID. CODE §952. In the case In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719,728 (7th
Cir. 1976), the court stated that it was "not persuaded" that the transfer of bank robbery
proceeds to an attorney was a "communication for which the clients could legitimately an-
ticipate confidentiality." Although the confidential communication must be made in the
course of an attorney-client relationship, the client is not required to employ the attorney
with whom he consults in order for the privilege to exist. Any information acquired by the
attorney during the interview and in the course of negotiations about employment is privi-
leged. Sullivanv. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64,69,105 Cal. Rptr. 241,244 (1972). See
also, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal op. 1057 (1968). There
is a presumption that whenever the attorney-client privilege is claimed that the communi-
cation was made in confidence, and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of
proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. CAL. EVID. CODE §917.
6. CAL. EVID. CODE §§901, 910, 914, 950-955. The California Victim's Bill of
Rights provides that it does not affect the statutory attorney-client privilege. CAL. CONST.
art. I, §28(d).
7. 394 P.2d at 684.
8. CAL. EvID. CODE §912. The attorney must be careful not to waive the privilege
without client authorization. In Dyas v. State, 539 S.W.2d 251, 256 (Ark. 1976), the court
found that it was defense counsel "... who opened the door to the examination of the wit-
ness about the source of the rings by his questions and disclosure during his cross examina-
tion."
9. The court in Schwimmerv. United States, 232 F.2d 855,863 (8th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) stated:[But] the attorney has the duty, upon any attempt to require him to testify or pro-
duce documents within the confidence, to make assertion of the privilege, not
merely for the benefit of the client, but also as a matter of professional responsibil-
ity in preventing the policy of the law from being violated.
An attorney "has a right to press legitimate arguments and to protest an erroneous ruling."
Gallagher v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 784,796, 192 P.2d 905, 913 (1948).
See also N.Y. City Bar Ass'n.Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. No. 312 (1934) (attorney
may not disclose confidential information until question of privilege has been resolved by
court).
10. CAL. EVID. CODE §956. When an attorney inquired of the Customs Office on
behalf of a client in order to ascertain what his obligation might be if an object he had
purchased had been smuggled into the United States by the seller, the attorney properly re-
fused to disclose his client's identity to the customs representative because he did not neces-
sarily intend to commit a crime. Okla. Bar Ass'n. Legal Ethics Comm. Advisory Op. 136(1937) (available from Oklahoma Bar Association, P.O. Box 53036, Oklahoma City, OK
73152).
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person who takes counsel on how he can safely commit a crime. ''
The attorney-client privilege is essential for the protection of an ac-
cused's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. An attorney cannot provide effective
assistance without a full disclosure of information by the client. The attor-
ney-client privilege is necessary to encourage full and open communica-
tion between the client and the attorney. With the protection of the
attorney-client privilege, a client can fully disclose information to an at-
torney without fear that the attorney will be forced to reveal the informa-
tion. This assurance is also needed to preserve the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination. If damaging information cannot be obtained
directly from the client because of his privilege against self-incrimination,
but the information could still be obtained from his attorney, the client
would be very reluctant to confide in his attorney.'2
A. Capacity ofAttorney
If the attorney is retained only to return evidence pertaining to a crime,
but not to perform any legal services, the attorney-client privilege may not
apply because the attorney is not performing in a professional capacity
and is not providing a professional service. In Hughes v Meade,13 an attor-
ney was telephoned at home on a Saturday morning and asked if he would
return some stolen property to the police department. While the attorney
was watching television, he claimed that an unseen person had left the
property on his front porch. After receiving the telephone call, the attor-
ney arranged for the police department to pick up the property. He was
paid solely for this service and did not represent the defendant at trial. The
attorney was held in contempt of court for failing to identify the person
11. Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 199-200, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Tex. 1953),
reh'g denied, 346 U.S. 905 (1953).
12. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 691, 631 P.2d at 51, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 617; Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1975). "As a practical matter if the client knows that dam-
aging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice." Id. People v. Col-
lie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 55, 634 P.2d 534,540-41, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458,464-65 (1981). The attorney-
client privilege is "not of constitutional orign... [but may have] important constitutional
implications.... Id. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798,801 (1975), affdmem., 376 N.Y.S.
2d 771 (1975), af/'dper curiam, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). "The effective-
ness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality of this attorney-client relationship. If
the lawyer cannot get all the facts about the case, he can only give his client half of a defense.
This, of necessity, involves the client telling his attorney everything remotely connected
with the crime." Id. State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 424 (1957). "[T]he attorney-client
privilege in this country... [i]s indispensable to the fulfillment of the constitutional security
against self-incrimination .. " Id. See also Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
13. 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1970).
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who had called him. The court stated:
[I]t is the opinion of the majority of the court that whether or not
a bona fide attorney-client relationship existed between the pe-
titioner and the undisclosed person, the principal transaction
involved, i.e., the delivery of stolen property to the police de-
partment, was not an act in the professional capacity of peti-
tioner nor was it the rendition of a legal service. He was acting as
an agent or conduit for the delivery of property which was com-
pletely unrelated to legal representation. While repose of confi-
dence in an attorney is something much to be desired, to use him
as a shield to conceal transactions involving stolen property is
beyond the scope of his professional duty and beyond the scope
of the privilege. 4
B. Identity of Client
If an attorney has been retained by a client who has not yet been
charged with a crime and who has turned over to the attorney evidence
that is not connectible to the client, the attorney may be in a position to
turn over the evidence to law enforcement officials and still keep his cli-
ent's identity confidential under the attorney-client privilege. The major-
ity rule is that the identity of an attorney's client is not a confidential
communication protected by the privilege. 5 Under the California minor-
ity rule, however, a client's identity may be privileged if a strong
probability exists that disclosure will implicate the client in the very crimi-
nal activity about which the legal advice is sought. 6 In Ex Parte McDon-
ough, 7 the California Supreme Court held that an attorney could not be
compelled to tell the grand jury the names of certain clients who had em-
ployed him to appear on behalf of three defendants and post cash bail for
one of them. The court concluded that application of the majority rule in
this situation would force the attorney to divulge a confidential communi-
cation tending to show an acknowledgment of guilt by the clients in con-
nection with the matter about which they had retained the attorney.
Similarly, in Bairdv. Koerner, 8 a tax attorney was retained by an account-
14. Id at 542.
15. Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 616,618,335 P.2d 484,486 (1959).
16. U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). Even under the
minority rule, the privilege does not apply if the legal representation was secured in further-
ance of a continuing or future crime. Id. at 1355. In In re Grand Jury appearance of Alvin S.
Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 421 U.S. 978 (1975), the court
stated that an "... . exception is made for cases where the existence of the attorney-client re-
lationship might be incriminating to a client (as... where an attorney returns a murder
weapon to the police.. .)." Id.
17. 170Cal.230, 149P.566(1915).
18. 279 F.2d 623,626-35(9th Cir. 1960).
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ant on behalf of taxpayers who had been advised that they had underpaid
their taxes. The Internal Revenue Service was not investigating the tax-
payers. The attorney delivered to the Service the amount determined to be
owing without disclosing his clients' identities. The trial court held the at-
torney in civil contempt because of his refusal to disclose their names.
However, the Ninth Circuit, following McDonough, reversed and held
that the identities of the clients were privileged.
The confidentiality of client identity rule was also applied in Anderson
v. State19, a Florida case in which the defendant was already charged with
a crime at the time the implicating evidence was delivered to law enforce-
ment personnel by the attorney. The accused had delivered stolen items to
his attorney's receptionist. The attorney then delivered the items to the
police. Both the attorney and receptionist were subpoenaed to testify at
trial about when, how, and from whom they had received the property.
The defendant's motions to quash the subpoena were denied and a peti-
tion for common-law certiorari was filed to the Florida District Court of
Appeal raising the issue of attorney-client privilege. The court of appeal
concluded that the delivery of the items by the client to the attorney's of-
fice constituted a communication protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. Although the court relied upon McDonough and Baird, which
involved the identity of clients who had not been charged with criminal
activity, the Florida court concluded that the facts of the case fit within
the minority privileged identity rule. While recognizing the public interest
in effective criminal prosecution and the likelihood that the attorney's tes-
timony would conclusively show that the accused once possessed the sto-
len property, the court believed that requiring the attorney to testify
would violate the basic concept of the attorney-client privilege. The court
noted that the defendant would not have delivered the evidence to the at-
torney and would not have talked to the attorney except for the attorney-
client relationship. Consequently, the court held that neither the attorney
nor his receptionist could be required to divulge the source of the evi-
dence, and the prosecution could not introduce evidence to show receipt
of the evidence from the attorney's office.20
C. Delivery of the Evidence
The attorney-client privilege does not protect the evidence itself, but it
does protect the fact of the delivery of the evidence to the attorney. In the
case of In re Ryder,2 attorney Ryder transferred money taken and a
19. Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1974).
20. Id at 875.
21. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713,714 (4th Cir. 1967); see also State v. Dillon, 471 P.2d
Pacific LawJournal / Vol. 15
weapon used in a bank robbery from his client's safe deposit box to his
own safe deposit box. The court found that one of Ryder's purposes was to
conceal the evidence and break the chain of possession to his client. Ryder
erroneously believed that the evidence itself was protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. The court stated:
It is an abuse of a lawyer's professional responsibility knowingly
to take possession of and secrete the fruits and instrumentalities
of a crime. Ryder's acts bear no reasonable relation to the privi-
lege and duty to refuse to divulge a client's confidential commu-
nication.'2
The delivery of stolen merchandise to an attorney's receptionist, however,
has been held a communication protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.23
D. Observation of the Evidence
If an attorney looks at evidence revealed to him by his client, the attor-
ney's observations as a result of the confidential communication are pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. In West Virginia v. Douglas,24 the
West Virginia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting
an attorney's testimony about the location of a pistol that he had discov-
ered as the result of a privileged communication from his client. The court
stated that excluding the actual communication from evidence while ad-
mitting observations that were made as a result of the privileged commu-
nication would have the same effect as requiring the attorney to testify
about confidential communications with his client concerning the pistol.
"It would be a slight safeguard, indeed, to confidential communications
made to counsel, if he was thus compelled substantially, to give them to a
jury, although he was required not to state them in the words of his cli-
ent."25 In other words, the attorney-client privilege cannot be circum-
vented by revealing facts discovered solely by reason of a confidential
communication.26
553,565 (Idaho 1970); Ethics, Law and Loyalty, supra note 1, at 980-82; cf. State v. Olwell,
394 P.2d at 683 (which erroneously held that material objects acquired by an attorney may
be protected as privileged communications).
22. Ryder, 381 F.2dat714.
23. 297 So. 2d at 875. The attorney's delivery to her client of a police report was a
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege. In re Navarro, 93 Cal. App. 3d
325, 330-31, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522,525 (1979).
24. 20 W. Va. 770 (1882).
25. Id. at 783.
26. State v. Sullivan, 373 P.2d 474,476 (Wash. 1962); Meredith, 89 Cal. 3d at 692
n.4, 631 P.2d at 52 n.4, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.4.
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E. Role of non-agent thirdparties
When a third party, who is not an agent of the attorney or client,
presents the evidence to the attorney or tells the attorney about it, the at-
torney-client'privilege does not apply.TA confidential communication
has not been made between the client and the attorney in the course of an
attorney-client relationship. If an investigator employed by the attorney
or client, however, is advised of the confidential attorney-client communi-
cation to accomplish the purpose for which the attorney was consulted,
the attorney-client privilege is applicable.
2 8
Two courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does not apply
in cases involving the delivery of evidence to defense counsel by a non-
agent third party. In Morrell v. State,29 the defendant, who was incarcer-
ated on a kidnapping charge, asked a friend to clean out the defendant's
vehicle. The friend found in the vehicle a writing tablet with a kidnap plan
outlined on it, and then turned the tablet over to the defendant's attorney.
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the friend was not acting as the de-
fendant's agent because the friend decided to turn the evidence over to the
deputy public defender without consulting the defendant. In a similar
case, People v. Lee,3" the defendant's neighbors found in their shrubbery
the shoes that the defendant had been wearing when he kicked his victim.
The neighbors heard that the defendant's wife had been looking for the
shoes and gave them to her. Subsequently, the defendant telephoned his
father, stated that he had hidden a pair of shoes in the neighbors' yard, and
asked his father to look for them. According to the state's brief,31 the fa-
ther refused the request. The father told the defendant's wife about the de-
27. Meredith, 89 Cal. 3dat693 n.5,631 P.2dat52n.5,175 Cal. Rptr. at618 n.5; see
also Clwell, 394 P.2d at 683-84.
28. CAL. EvID. CODE §912(d); seeMeredith, 89 Cal. 3d at 690 n.3,631 P.2d at 50-51
n.3, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17 n.3.
29. 575 P.2d at 1211 n.17. In Dyas, the defense attorney asked a prosecution witness
whether he had brought him two rings removed from the murder victim. On redirect exami-
nation, the officer testified that the defense attorney said he had obtained them from a safe
deposit box. The court found that the attorney-client privilege was not applicable because
the evidence was not received from the client. 539 S.W.2d at 256.
30. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514,519-21, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715,717-19 (1970). One of theissuesin
Lee was whether the shoes had been illegally seized by the District Attorney. The deputy
public defender was relieved prior to the preliminary hearing. In order to avoid being pros-
ecuted for suppression of evidence and to prevent seizure of the shoes by the prosecution
without a court determination of their possible privileged character, the deputy public de-
fender delivered the shoes to the Municipal Court judge, who was scheduled to preside over
the preliminary hearing. The deputy public defender believed that he had an agreement
with the deputy district attorney that thejudge would retain the evidence as a "private citi-
zen" until an appropriate judicial determination of its proper disposition. Subsequently,
the prosecution obtained the shoes pursuant to a search warrant issued by a Superior Court
judge. The appellate court decided that the prosecution did not obtain the evidence ille-
gally. Id. at 524-26, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 721-23.
31. Brief of Respondent at 5; People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715
(1970) (filed in California State Law Library, Sacramento).
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fendant's telephone call. The defendant's wife then gave the shoes to an
investigator from the public defender's office, who placed them in a
drawer of the desk used by the deputy public defender representing the
defendant. The California District Court of Appeal found no evidence
that the defendant's estranged wife was acting as the defendant's agent or
under his direction.3" Testimony was therefore admissible in Lee that the
public defender received the shoes from the defendant's wife,just as testi-
mony was admissible in Morrell that the public defender received the tab-
let from the defendant's friend.33
F. Balancing the Interest in Confidentiality with the Interest in Production
of Evidence
The first court to balance the interest in the attorney-client privilege
with the interest in the production of evidence in the context of implicat-
ing evidence was the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Olwell. In
dicta and without citing any authority, the court announced a rule that de-
fense counsel should turn over evidence to the prosecution and the prose-
cution should not disclose the source. Subsequent appellate courts have
uncritically approved this dicta.34
The briefs in State v. Olwell reveal that during his personal investigation
on behalf of a client suspected of murder, attorney Olwell obtained a knife
belonging to his client, but not the one used in the fatal stabbing. Accord-
ing to the state's brief, Olwell wrote the prosecuting attorney that he had
obtained the defendant's knife, and that if charges were filed, he would
preserve it until the time of trial. Olwell stated that he had talked to several
"respected counsel" and that he believed he had no duty or right to surren-
der possession of the knife because of the attorney-client relationship.
Olwell further stated that he would surrender the knife if ordered to do so
after a hearing before the Washington Supreme Court.3
When the deputy prosecuting attorney received the letter, he assumed
that Olwell possessed the murder weapon because otherwise the letter
would have been pointless. The prosecutor believed that a search of
Olwell's office pursuant to a warrant would undermine the attorney-client
32. People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514,527,83 Cal. Rptr. 715,723 (1970).
33. Id. at 524-26,83 Cal. Rptr. at 723; Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1211 n. 17.
34. State v. Olwell 394 P.2d 681,684-85 (Wash. 1964). See infra note 266.
35. Brief of Respondent at 5; Stateexrel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). The
appellant's and respondent's briefs are in Brief 64 (2d) Wash. Vol. 23,787-841, available on
interlibrary loan from Washington State Law Library, Temple of Justice, Olympia, Wash-
ington 98504. The Washington Supreme Court in its summary of facts in Olwell relied on
the record and undisputed statements of facts in the briefs. When facts in this article are
mentioned from a brief, these facts are undisputed, but not recited by the court in its opin-
ion.
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privilege, including the privileges of clients other than the accused, and
would therefore be inappropriate.36 The prosecutor decided that a
broadly drawn subpoena duces tecum, which he believed would not re-
quire Olwell to authenticate the knife, would be less intrusive upon the at-
torney-client privilege.37
Olwell was served with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to bring
to a coroner's inquest all knives in his possession and under his control re-
lating to his client, the victim, and his client's girlfriend. Olwell declined
to comply with the subpoena as it pertained to his client on the grounds of
the attorney-client privilege and his client's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The coroner, and subsequently the trial court, found Olwell in
contempt, and he appealed.38
After his client was convicted of murder, Olwell's contempt conviction
was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. The issues considered by
the court were whether an attorney may refuse to produce material evi-
dence of a crime by claiming the attorney-client privilege or his client's
privilege against self-incrimination.39 The court held that Olwell's refusal
to testify at the coroner's inquest on the ground of the attorney-client priv-
36. A search warrant can be served on an attorney's office and does not require au-
thenticating testimony. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1523-28. In Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1975) an attorney was charged with the crime of false pretenses. Pursuant to a
search warrant, a file pertaining to the real estate transaction in question was seized from
the attorney's office and introduced into evidence. The records were clearly incriminating.
However, each document had been prepared voluntarily. The United States Supreme
Court pointed out that the attorney "... was not asked to say or to do anything. The records
seized contained statements that [he] had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for
and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when
these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert...."
Id. at 473. There was no compulsion for the attorney to speak, other than the inherent psy-
chological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence. Id
37. Brief of Respondent at 9-11; Olwell, 394 P.2d at681.
38. Olwell, 394 P.2d at 683. When an attorney questions a trial court's ruling on a
matter of privilege, he should file a writ or a notice of appeal, whichever is the correct proce-
dure in his jurisdiction, and have the matter decided by a higher court. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n.
Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. No. 528 (1981). The appellant's brief argued that a Washington
attorney is under a duty according to the Washington State Bar Act, R.C.W. 2.48.210, to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client, and that an attorney could be disbarred or
suspended under R.C.W. 2.48.220(3) for violating this duty. Brief of Appellant at 14-15;
394 P.2d 681. The murder trial was completed before the Washington Supreme Court de-
cided the contempt appeal. The court in the murder trial ruled that it would be improper to
compel Owell to provide testimony"... which might tend to incriminate his client or which
might tend to hamper his representation of his client at the trial." Olwel was required to
make the knife available to the prosecution outside the presence of thejury. At this time the
prosecution first learned that Olwell did not possess the murder weapon, but rather pos-
sessed another of his client's knives that had been in the possession of his client's ex-wife.
Brief of Respondent at 6; 394 P.2d 681.
39. Olwell, 394 P.2d at 682. Although it was not clear from the record whether
Olwell obtained possession of the knife, which at the time of the coroner's inquest was con-
sidered as possibly the murder weapon, as a result of a confidential communication with
the defendant or through his own independent investigation, the Washington Supreme
Court for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege analysis assumed that the knife was
obtained as a result of a confidential communication. Id at 683. The court concluded that
the privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the client and cannot be asserted by
the attorney. Id. at 686.
Pacific LawJournal / Vol. 15
ilege was not contemptuous. The court stated that the subpoena, which
named the client and required the attorney to produce in an open hearing
evidence allegedly received from the client, was defective on its face be-
cause the subpoena required the attorney to testify about privileged com-
munications without the client's consent.'n
After resolving the contempt issues, the Washington Supreme Court
then went much further, apparently to provide guidance in the future for
Washington attorneys holding evidence received from clients charged
with crimes. The court attempted to balance the attorney-client privilege
and the privilege against self-incrimination with the public interest in the
criminal investigation process. In dicta, the court stated:
[W]e are in agreement that the attorney-client privilege is appli-
cable to the knife held by appellant, but do not agree that the
privilege warrants the attorney, as an officer of the court, from
withholding it after being properly requested to produce the
same. The attorney should not be a depository for criminal evi-
dence (such as a knife, other weapons, stolen property, etc.),
which in itself has little, if any, material value for the purpose of
aiding counsel in the preparation of his client's case. Such evi-
dence given the attorney during legal consultation for informa-
tion purposes and used by the attorney in preparing the defense
of his client's case, whether or not the case ever goes to trial,
could clearly be withheld for a reasonable period of time. It fol-
lows that the attorney, after a reasonable period, should, as an
officer of the court, on his own motion turn the same over to the
prosecution....
We think the attorney-client privilege should and can be pre-
served even though the attorney surrenders the evidence he has
in his possession. The prosecution, upon receipt of such evi-
dence from an attorney, where a charge against the attorney's
client is contemplated (presently orin the future), should be well
aware of the existence of the attorney-client privilege. There-
fore, the state, when attempting to introduce such evidence at
the trial, should take extreme precautions to make certain that
the source of the evidence is not disclosed in the presence of the
40. Id at 684.
On the basis of the attorney-client privilege, the subpoena duces tecum issued by
the coroner is defective on its face because it requires the attorney to give testimony
concerning information received by him from his client in the course of their con-
ferences. The subpoena names the client and requires his attorney to produce, in an
open hearing, physical evidence allegedly received from the client. This is tanta-
mount to requiring the attorney to testify against the client without the latter's con-
sent.
Id
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jury and prejudicial error is not committed. By thus allowing the
prosecution to recover such evidence, the public interest is
served, and by refusing the prosecution an opportunity to dis-
close the source of the evidence, the client's privilege is pre-
served and a balance is reached between these conflicting
interests. The burden of introducing such evidence at a trial
would continue to be upon the prosecution.41
Prior to Olwell, Washington attorneys had no duty to deliver evidence
to law enforcement officials on their own motion under either statutory or
case law. Their statutory duties included upholding the United States and
Washington state constitutions and preserving their clients' confi-
dences.42 The duties of Washington attorneys under case law included re-
fraining from (1) concealing from the court any material fact such as the
existence of another similar judicial proceeding,43 (2) soliciting money to
bribe referees,' 4 (3) contacting jurors during ajudicial proceeding, 45 and
(4) advising a client to lie.46
Although the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics
by statute was "the standard of ethics" for members of the Washington
Bar at the time of the Olwell decision,47 the canons did not include an at-
torney's duty to turn over evidence on his own motion.48 Subsequently,
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, as promulgated by
the American Bar Association in 1969 and adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court, a mandatory ethical duty arguably exists for counsel to
41. Id at 684-85. This language is quoted approvingly in People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App.
3d at 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722. The court in People v. Investigation Into a Certain Weapon,
448 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1982) also applied a balancing approach. The defendant in the
presence of his common-law wife turned over to his attorney ammunition and an ammuni-
tion clip. A subpoena duces tecum was served on the attorney requiring production of these
items before the Grand Jury. A motion to quash was denied and defense counsel was or-
dered to deliver the items to the District Attorney. The court held that the transfer of these
items by the client to the attorney would have been protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege except for the presence of his common-law wife. The court was particularly concerned
about the client's constitutional rights: (1) the client could assert his privilege against self-
incrimination if he was served with a subpoena duces tecum, but the attorney could not as-
sert it on his behalf; (2) the effect on the client's right to counsel of the attorney's testimony
against his own client; and (3) the client's right to a fair trial. On the other hand, the court
was aware that the prosecution could obtain the items by means of a search warrant. The
court concluded:
Therefore, a practical solution to the dilemma presented by this case mandates that
defense counsel turn over the ammunition and clip to the District Attorney's Office
without the necessity of the attorney personally appearing before the Grand Jury..
Thereby the public interest in criminal investigation is balanced fairly with the
other public interest of affording the defendant a fair trial with counsel of his own
choosing.
Id at 955.
42. WASH. REV. CODE §2.48.210.
43. In re Coons, 250 P.2d 976,980 (Wash. 1952).
44. State ex rel. Hardin v. Grover, 91 P. 564,564 (Wash. 1907).
45. In re Bruener, 294 P. 254,256-57 (Wash. 1930).
46. In re Ballou, 295 P.2d 316,318 (Wash. 1956).
47. WASH. REv. CODE §2.48.230.
48. See ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 5, 15,22,29,32, 37,39 (1908).
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disclose confidential information when served with a subpoena.49 This ar-
gument is based on a reading of the provisions of Disciplinary Rules 4-
101(C)(2) and 7-102(A)(3). DR 4-101(C)(2) provides that a lawyer "may
reveal" confidences or secrets when "required by law or court order." DR
7-102(A)(3) provides that a lawyer shall not "[c]onceal or knowingly fail
to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." Unlike DR 7-
102(B)(1), which imposes an affirmative duty on an attorney to reveal a
client's past fraud upon a tribunal, unless the attorney learned of the fraud
through a confidential communication, DR 7-102(A)(3) contains no ex-
ception for privileged communications. The Washington Supreme Court,
reading DR 4-101 (C)(2) and DR 7-102(A)(3) together, has held that an at-
torney is required to disclose confidential client information contained in
documents that are subpoenaed. 0 In contrast is a case involving defense
attorneys who learned about the locations of the bodies of two victims
through confidential client communications and who did not report that
information to authorities. A New York court held that the attorneys'
duty of confidentiality prevailed over two "psuedo-criminal" statutes,
which required that a body be provided a decent burial and that the death
49. SeeAmerican Bar Foundation, Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility
172-78 (1979). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the Amen-
can Bar Association in 1969, and has been adopted entirely or in part by most states. The
Model Code consists of three parts. The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, which
express in general terms standards of professional conduct expected of attorneys. The Dis-
ciplinary Rules (DR) state minimum levels of conduct. If an attorney violates a Discipli-
nary Rule, he is subject to discipline. The Ethical Considerations (E- are aspirational in
nature and represent objectives toward which attorneys should strive, but are not a basis
for discipline. Id at 2-4.
In August 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. These rules are the work product of the Committee on the Evaluation of
Professional Standards, also known as the Kutak Commission. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct before becoming operative must be adopted by the various states. Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(a) provides that a "lawyer shall not ... unlawfully ob-
struct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document
or other material having potential evidentary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist an-
other person to do any such act ......
50. In re Kerr, 548 P.2d 297,301 n.2 (Wash. 1976). The attorney was disbarred for
attempting to suborn perjury. In the attorney's presence, his client M requested the bur-
glary victims' attorney to persuade his clients to testify or sign affidavits different than their
statements about the burglary to law enforcement officials. The request was refused. The
attorney unsuccessfully moved for a continuance of the trial because he claimed that he
possessed affidavits that convinced him there should be no trial. After the attorney's clients
were convicted of the burglary, a special inquiryjudge investigated M's activities. The at-
torney was served with a subpoena duces tecum for the affidavits. He testified that he al-
lowed M to remove the affidavits from his file because he considered them to be protected
by the attorney-client privilege. The Washington Supreme Court commented on the attor-
neys contention in a footnote as follows:
DR 7-102(A)(3). In his representation of his client, a lawyer shall not conceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal. DR 4-
101(C)(2). A lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets of his client when required
by court order. RCW 7.20.010(10). Disobedience of a subpoena duly served is con-
tempt of court.
Id at 301 n.2.
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of any person without medical attendance must be reported.51
G. People v. Meredith exception for removal or alteration of evidence.
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Meredith, uncritically fol-
lowed the Olivell dicta and also created an unprecedented exception to the
attorney-client privilege when defense counsel removes or alters the evi-
dence.52 In the Meredith case, Meredith's co-defendant, Scott, was
charged with conspiracy to commit murder and robbery. After being
urged by his court-appointed attorney to tell him everything so that the
defense would not be "sandbagged" by the prosecution, Scott revealed
what happened after Meredith shot the victim. Scott stated that he took
the victim's wallet, returned to his residence with his roommate, Mere-
dith, and divided the money in the wallet with him. Scott further revealed
that he tried to burn the wallet, and threw it in a trash can behind his resi-
dence. After receiving this information, Scott's attorney then sent an in-
vestigator to find the wallet and bring it to him. The attorney verified that
the wallet belonged to the victim and immediately turned it over to a po-
lice detective assigned to the case. The attorney did not tell the detective
how he discovered the wallet, but the detective knew that the attorney was
representing Scott. Subsequently, the attorney withdrew as Scott's coun-
sel.53
The crucial evidence showing that Scott conspired with Meredith to rob
and kill the victim was the location behind Scott's residence where the vic-
tim's wallet was found. At trial, the prosecutor called the investigator for
Scott's counsel as a witness, and asked him where he had found the wallet.
The prosecutor did not ask the investigator any questions, which, if an-
swered, would have linked the investigator to Scott or to Scott's first attor-
ney. On cross-examination, Scott's trial attorney asked the investigator by
whom he had been employed and under whose direction he had located
the wallet. When called by defense counsel, Scott's first attorney testified
about his directions to the investigator. Scott then testified about how he
had gained possession of the wallet and what he had done with it.54
In deciding that the investigator's observation of the wallet's location
as a result of a confidential attorney-client communication was privileged
51. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798, affd mern., 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), affd
per curiam, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867,359 N.E.2d 377 (1976).
52. People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 694,631 P.2d 46, 53, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 619,
(1981).
53. Id. at 687-89,631 P.2d at 49-50, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
54. Id. at 689, 631 P.2d at 50, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 616. In one of its appellate briefs, the
State argued that Scott's defense counsel was trying to show that Scott was innocent and
that he had cooperated with law enforcement in bringing Meredith to justice. Opposition to
Petition for Rehearing at 2 (filed Aug. 7, 1981 with California Supreme Court).
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information, the California Supreme Court weighed competing policy
considerations. On the one hand, the court recognized that denial of pro-
tection to this type of observation might inhibit attorney-client communi-
cation and undermine the attorney's investigation because the client
might not tell the attorney everything he knew. On the other hand, the
court was aware that extending protection to this type of observation
would prevent the prosecution from locating and introducing evidence
because the defense had seized it first.55
As a solution to this dilemma, the California Supreme Court crafted an
exception to the attorney-client privilege. The court held that the privilege
is waived when defense counsel removes or alters the evidence. The court
reasoned that the alteration or removal of physical evidence by defense
counsel deprives the prosecution of an opportunity to observe that evi-
dence in its original condition or location. If testimony about the original
location and condition is inadmissible under the attorney-client privilege,
the court further reasoned that the defense could, in effect, "destroy" criti-
cal information. If this were the case, the court believed that extending the
attorney-client privilege to situations in which the defense removed evi-
dence "might encourage defense counsel to race the police to seize critical
evidence. '56 The court concluded that:
[Wlhenever defense counsel removes or alters evidence, the stat-
utory privilege does not bar revelation of the original location or
condition of the evidence in question. We thus view the defense
decision to remove evidence as a tactical choice. If defense coun-
sel leaves the evidence where he discovers it, his observations de-
rived from privileged communications are insulated from
revelation. If, however, counsel chooses to remove evidence to
examine or test it, the original location and condition of that evi-
dence loses the protection of the privilege.57
The California Supreme Court in Meredith rejected as "unworkably
speculative" the contention by the defense that this exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege should apply only if law enforcement officials would
have "inevitably discovered" the evidence in its original location during
the normal course of their investigation if defense counsel had not previ-
55. Meredith, 29 Cal.3d. at694-95,631 P.2d at53-54,175 Cal. Rptr. at619-20.
56. Id at 694,631 P.2d at 53, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619. "Alter" means: " 1.To make dif-
ferent without changing into something else; to vary; to modify." WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 34 (4th Ed. 1974). "Remove" means: "1. To change the location of,
to transfer, especially in order to re-establish." Id. at 978.
57. 29 Cal. 3d at 695,631 P.2d at 54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The California Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the investigator's testimony about
the location of the wallet. Id. Scott's conviction of first degree murder and robbery was af-
firmed. Id. at 621.
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ously removed it.58 If the California Supreme Court had adopted this "in-
evitable discovery" approach, the Meredith exception to the attorney-
client privilege probably would not have applied in the Meredith case be-
cause law enforcement officials, prior to removal of the wallet by the in-
vestigator, had conducted a search of the defendant's residence pursuant
to a search warrant without finding the implicating evidence and appar-
ently conducted no subsequent search.59 The Meredith court, however,
reasoned that evidence can be discovered not only as a result of deliberate
police searches, but also as a result of chance by police or lay persons. The
court concluded that "to ask where, how long, and how carefully they
would have looked is obviously to compel speculation as to theoretical fu-
ture conduct of the police." 60
In describing how this exception should be implemented, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court indicated that the prosecution should present the evi-
dence without divulging the original source of the information or the
content of any attorney-client communication. 61 For example, in Mere-
dith, the prosecuting attorney only asked the investigator where he found
the wallet; the prosecutor did not have the witness identify himself as the
defendant's investigator. The court further suggested that when obtaining
similar testimony is impossible without identifying the witness as the de-
fendant's attorney or investigator, the defendant might be willing to stip-
58. Id. at 695,631 P.2d at53, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619. Some states, including Califor-
nia, follow an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this excep-
tion, if the prosecution can prove a high probability that evidence, which had been
unconstitutionally obtained, would have been discovered through a proper investigation,
the item of evidence is admissible. People v. Superior Court (Tunch), 80 Cal. App. 3d 665,
671-83, 145 Cal. Rptr. 795,798-805 (1978).
59. People v. Meredith (Crim. No. 8986 Third District Nov. 21, 1979).
60. 29 Cal. 3d at 695,631 P.2d at 54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620. In People v. Clutchette
(Ct. of App. 3d Dist. 3 Crim. 11192, filed March 25, 1982), an unpublished opinion, the de-
fendant was charged with first degree murder. He had the bloody seat covers and carpets of
the car in which the victim was shot replaced and kept the receipt from the auto recondi-
tioning shop. His wife, who formerly had worked as an investigator for his attorney and
who was involved in a child custody dispute with him, voluntarily turned over the receipts
to the police. A forensic serologist established the seat covers had blood stains of the same
blood type as the victim. The defendant's suggestion that attorneys be allowed to return ev-
idence in its original state to the site of discovery was rejected. The evidence was conflicting
whether counsel had instructed defendant's wife after she obtained the receipts to destroy
them or deliver them to him. The receipts had been obtained probably in July or August
1978 from the reconditioning shop, and were turned over to the police in April 1979 after
the initial murder charges had been dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in December
1978. Petition for Hearing to California Supreme Court at 5 (available from California
State Law Library, Sacramento California). The court did not discuss California Penal
Code Section 135, which provides the destruction or concealment of evidence is a misde-
meanor. The court stated:
The court in People v. Meredith ... rejected as speculative a test based upon the
probability of eventual discovery by police before disclosure of the place from
which evidencewas removed by defense counsel. The "return rule" is similarily ob-jectionable. Temporary removal of evidence reduces the likelihood the evidence
will be found, especially if the place where the evidence had been is searched by au-
thorities during the time the evidence is in defense counsel's possession.
People v. Clutchette at 6.
61. 29 Cal. 3d at 695 n.8,631 P.2d at 54n.8, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620 n.8.
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ulate to the relevant location or condition of the evidence. If such a
stipulation was offered, the court indicated that the prosecution should
not be permitted to reject the stipulation to compel the defendant's attor-
ney to testify and consequently to allow thejury to infer that the attorney
obtained the information from the accused.62
The stipulation procedure described in Meredith is fraught with danger
to unsuspecting defense counsel. It is conceivable that a trial judge might
rule that a stipulation to the location and condition of the evidence alone
would impair the prosecution's case and that the testimony of the attor-
ney and the investigator is admissible. In suggesting the stipulation ap-
proach, the California Supreme Court referred to People v. Hall,63 which
held that in the prosecution of an ex-felon for possession of a concealable
firearm, the element of a prior felony conviction may be not be stated to
the jury if the accused stipulates to the prior conviction. An exception to
this rule exists, however, if the state can clearly demonstrate that a stipula-
tion will legitimately impair the prosecutor's case.64 If the facts to which
the defendant has offered to stipulate retain some probative value, then
evidence of those facts may be introduced. The evidence retains some pro-
bative value and is admissible if the stipulation is limited in scope or if it
deprives a party of the legitimate force and effect of material evidence.65
II. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
When defense counsel deals with implicating evidence, he must be care-
ful not to deprive the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination. If
the accused is served with a subpoena duces tecum for the implicating evi-
dence, usually he can successfully assert his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. If evidence implicating the client is subpoenaed from defense
counsel, however, defense counsel will not be allowed to assert the privi-
lege against self-incrimination because no compulsion is exerted upon
him to be a witness against himself.66
62. Id
63. 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980). Evidence offered to
prove a fact that is not genuinely disputed is irrelevant. Id at 152,616 P.2d at 831, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 849.
64. Id at 152-53,616 P.2d at 831,167 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
65. Id at 153,616 P.2d at 831,167 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
66. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1975). The fifth amendment pro-
vides in relevant part that no "person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself.... U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL.
EvID. CODE §§930, 940. The elements of the privilege against self-incrimination are: (1)
compulsion (2) of testimony (3) resulting in self-incrimination. 425 U.S. at 399. The fifth
amendment has been interpreted to prohibit testimonial disclosures that might be a "link in
a chain" of evidence to the accused. Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449,461 (1975). The protec-
tion of the fifth amendment "adheres basically to the person, not to information that may
incrminate him." Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). "A party is privileged
from producing the evidence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228
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The leading United States Supreme Court decision on whether compli-
ance with a subpoena duces tecum or summons violates an individual's
privilege against self-incrimination is Fisher v. United States.67 In Fisher,
the taxpayer defendants were under investigation for possible civil or
criminal federal income tax violations. The taxpayers delivered to their at-
torneys work papers prepared by their accountants. The Internal Reve-
nue Service served summons on the attorneys to produce the accountants'
workpapers, and the attorneys refused to comply.68 Justice White defined
the issue as "whether a summons directing an attorney to produce docu-
ments delivered to him by his client in connection with the attorney-client
relationship is enforceable over claims that the documents were constitu-
tionally immune from summons in the hands of the client and retained
that immunity in the hands of the attorney."69 The Supreme Court then
held that compliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to produce
the accountant's documents would involve no incriminating testimony
that is within the protection of the fifth amendment and that the summons
could be enforced against the attorneys.7°
In deciding that the taxpayers would not be testifying against them-
selves by producing their accountants' work papers, the Supreme Court
stated that compliance with the summons by the clients would not rise "to
U.S. 457,458 (1913). An order to an attorney to produce a client's system accounting pre-
pared by the attorney was held not to be violative of the clients' fifth amendment rights be-
cause the clients were under no compulsion to authenticate. See In re Fisher, 575 F.2d 209,
213 (9th Cir. 1977).
Since the person upon whom a search warrant is served is not compelled to respond to
the warrant, the testimonial element for a violation of the fifth amendment is lacking. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,470-76 (1975). A search warrant may be issued in Cal-
ifornia for stolen or embezzled property, instrumentalities of a felony, items in possession
of someone for the purpose of concealment or prevention of discovery, or any evidence
which tends to show a felony has been committed or that a particular person has committed
a felony. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(l)-(4). These items maybe taken on the warrant from
any person in possession of them or from any place. Id § 1524(b). A search warrant may be
issued only upon probable cause, supported by an affidavit naming or describing the per-
son and particularly describing the items and the place to be searched. Id § 1525. A specific
procedure must be followed in California for the issuance and execution of a search war-
rant for documentary evidence in an attorney's office, if the attorney is not reasonably sus-
pected of engaging in or having engaged in criminal activity related to the documentary
evidence for which the warrant is requested. The application for the search warrant must
specify that the place to be searched is in the possession or under the control of an attorney.
Id A special master must be appointed at the time of the issuance of the warrant to accom-
pany whomever serves the warrant. When the warrant is served, the special master must in-
form the attorney about the specific items being sought. If the attorney, in thejudgment of
the special master, fails to provide these requested items, the special master must conduct a
search for the items in the area indicated in the search warrant. If the attorney states that an
item or items should not be disclosed, the item or items must be sealed by the special master
and taken to the Superior Court for a hearing. Id § 1524(c)(l)- (3). If a claim of privilege is
made and the court determines no other feasible means are available to rule on the validity
of the claim, the court may hold an in camera inspection of the documents. CAL. EVID.
CODE §915(a), (b). See FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(a), (c).
67. 425 U.S. 391 (1975); see also United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984). C
68. 425 U.S. at 395.
69. Id at 393.
70. Id at414.
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the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment" be-
cause compliance added "little or nothing to the sum total of the Govern-
ment's information.. ."; the Internal Revenue Service already knew
about the existence and location of the workpapers.7 ' Moreover, the
Court stated that responding to the summons would not authenticate the
workpapers because the taxpayers were not competent to authenticate for
admission into evidence at trial papers prepared by their accountants. Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that responding to the summons would not ap-
pear to represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination because the
taxpayers only could express their belief that the papers were those de-
scribed in the summons.72
A. Implicit Authentication
The Supreme Court did not resolve the fifth amendment "implicit au-
thentication" question in Fisher because the parties did not prepare the
work papers and could not authenticate them. When a person complies
with a subpoena duces tecum, he "implicitly testifies that the evidence he
brings forth is in fact the evidence demanded."73 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has stated that the effect of a subpoena duces tecum
served on an individual and requiring production of the person's records
is the same as requiring the individual to testify and admit the genuineness
of the records.74 When an accused is forced to produce his records, the
prosecutor can subsequently introduce them into evidence. If the accused
wants to dispute or explain the records, he must then testify. 75 According
to Wigmore on Evidence, a testimonial disclosure of constitutional di-
mension is implicit in the production of documents or chattels pursuant to
a subpoena duces tecum:
It is the witness' assurance, compelled as an incident of the pro-
cess, that the articles produced are-the ones demanded. No
71. Id. at 411; see also United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir.
1977). Enforcement of IRS summons against attorney for production of business docu-
ments did not violate client's fifth amendment rights because it involved no testimonial
self-incrimination, and any tacit concessions as to existence, possession, and belief that
documents were those described did not rise to the level of testimony protected by the fifth
amendment. United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 118 (9th Cir. 1979). Admission into
evidence of defendant's passport did not violate his fifth amendment rights even though
production tacitly admitted the existence, possession, and belief that it was the document
requested because it was of minimum significance in the case and did not rise to the level of
testimony protected by the fifth amendment.
72. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412-13; In re Fred R. Witte Center Glass No. 3, 544 F.2d
1026, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1976) (accountant's work papers in possession of accused not pro-
tected by fifth amendment from production merely because this action would be incrimi-
nating because no implied authentication).
73. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,344,346 (1973).
74. U.S. v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267,270 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. Id.
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meaningful distinction can be drawn between a communication
necessarily implied by legally compelled conduct and one au-
thenticating the articles expressly made under compulsion in
court. Testimonial acts of this sort--authenticating or vouching
for pre-existing chattels-are not typical of the sort of disclo-
sures which are caught in the main current of history and senti-
ments giving vitality to the privilege. Yet they are within the
borders of its protection.76
A Massachusetts court has held that an accused cannot be compelled to
produce an instrumentality of the crime because his "implicit authentica-
tion" might be a "link in a chain" of evidence against him. In Common-
wealth v. Hughes,77 the charge against the defendant was assault with a
dangerous weapon. An order compelling the defendant to produce a
weapon for ballistics testing was reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, Berkshire Division, observed that the "converse infer-
ence" from Fisher was that "assertions implied from production of things
(whether or not documents) are within the Fifth Amendment, and thus
justify the refusal to produce, when they are nontrivial and incriminat-
ing. '78 The prosecution possessed evidence that the defendant was the
registered owner of the weapon prior to the crime. The existence, location,
and control of the weapon at the time of the order were not a foregone con-
clusion. If the defendant produced the weapon, he would "implicitly"
provide a statement about its existence, location, and control from which
the prosecution would conclude he had possession and control at some
time after the alleged crime. Production of the weapon would furnish a
"link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution" because a re-
covered bullet from the scene of the crime might be connected to the pro-
duced weapon through ballistics tests. Even if the prosecution did not
indicate at trial that the defendant produced the gun, the court believed
that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination would still be vio-
lated.79
Several courts have held that an accused cannot be compelled to pro-
duce personal documents because implicit authentication would result in
testimonial self-incrimination. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Beattie80 interpreted Fisher as providing fifth amendment
76. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2264 at 380. (McNaughton rev. 1961) (quoted ap-
provingly in Beattie, 522 F.2d at 270 n.6, and State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County,
625 P.2d 316,319-20 n.3 (Ariz. 1981)).
77. 404 N.E.2d 1239 (Mass. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); see also Gold-
smith v. Superior Ct., 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1984).
78. Id at 1243.
79. Id at 1244-45.
80. 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2nd Cir. 1976). In addition to the implicit authentication
question, the Fisher court left unanswered the question whether personal papers are pro-
Pacific LawJournal / Vol 15
protection against"an Internal Revenue Service summons to the taxpayer
for letters addressed to his accountant that were still in the taxpayer's pos-
session. The court reasoned that the taxpayer's authentication would be
testimonial self-incrimination. In United States v. Plesons,8' the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that patient records of a doctor charged
with unlawful distribution of drugs were protected. The Arizona Supreme
Court has similarly held that a defendant who had been charged with sex-
ual misconduct with his minor daughter could not be compelled to pro-
duce letters to her in which he allegedly discussed the criminal acts
because compliance would authenticate the letters and be an incriminat-
ing communicative act.8"
The fifth amendment implicit authentication analysis has also been ap-
plied to prevent an accused's production of tape recordings. In Matter of
Vanderbilt (Rosner-Hickey),83 the New York Court of Appeals, following
Fisher, held that a tape of self-incriminating conversations in the posses-
sion of its maker would be privileged because "testimonial evidence" was
involved. After learning that he was the target of an assault investigation,
tected from compelled production. The Supreme Court in Fisher did not expressly overrule
U.S. v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which held that an individual's private books and papers
are protected by both the fourth and fifth amendments. In his concurring opinion in Fisher,
Justice Brennan indicated that the majority implied that the fifth amendment would no
longer afford protection to private papers. 425 U.S. at 415. Judge Kennedy in his concur-
ring opinion in the case of Matter of Fred R. Witte Center Glass No. 3, 544 F.2d 1026 (9th
Cir. 1979) attempted to shed some light on the meaning of the Fisher majority decision. He
stated:
The Fisher case may not apply to other writings or materials, especially those of a
private nature, even where the testimonial assertion does not amount to an implicit
authentication. This is not a recognition that the contents of such writings necessa-
rily are protected; rather, it follows from the high probability that an order to pro-
duce personal papers may compel assertions or communications that fall within
the privilege.
Id at 1029. However, later in the same United States Supreme Court term, Justice Black-
mun for the majority in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at473-74, referring to Fisherstated
that "[T]he Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena
for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of produc-
tion may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information ......
When determining whether production of documents will violate the fifth amendment, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applies a Boyd test in addition to a Fisher testimonial analy-
sis. If an individual has in his actual or constructive possession incriminating papers,
whether personal or business in nature, which he wrote or were written under his immediate
supervision, these documents are absolutely protected from production pursuant to a sub-
poena or summons. United States v. Miller, 660 F.2d 563, 566-67 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1041-43 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Authement, 607
F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. 560 F.2d 890,892-93(8th Cir. 1977).
82. State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 625 P.2d 316, 320 (Ariz. 1981).
Since the letters were privileged in the possession of the client, the court held that the letters
were privileged in possession of the defendant's counsel to whom the letters had been deliv-
ered for preparation of the defense and to whom the subpoena duces tecum was directed.
Id.
83. 453 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. 1982); see also Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263 (Fla.
1980) (holding that attorney under Fisher can invoke attorney-client privilege against pro-
duction pursuant to subpoena of illegal tape recordings of telephone conversations because
client could assert privilege against self-incrimination and tapes were delivered to attorney
for purpose of legal advice).
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Doctor R made two tape recordings, and unsuccessully attempted sui-
cide. Doctor R's wife obtained the sealed tapes, temporarily left the tapes
with an attorney friend, and then turned the still-sealed tapes over to the
son of her husband's attorney. The tape recordings were subsequently
subpoenaed from the attorney. The court defined testimonial evidence as
"that which communicates the witness' ideas or thoughts, that exposes the
witness' mental state or thought process,"'84 and concluded that the one
tape, which was not protected by the marital privilege, and its production
were testimonial in nature. By producing the tape, the accused "would not
only express his belief that this is the tape sought by the Grand Jury, but
would be vouching for the circumstances of its preparation, its accuracy,
and the conclusions drawn from it."85
When dealing with the "implicit authentication" issue, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals does not find self-incrimination when someone other
than the accused authenticates the object at trial because the act of pro-
duction then is not a testimonial communication by which the witness is
compelled to affirm the truth of a statement that incriminates him. In
United States v. Authement,86 the Fifth Circuit allowed production by the
accused's attorney of an instrumentality of the crime because the defen-
dant was not required to authenticate it. The defendant, a former police
officer, was charged with beating a suspect using brass knuckles. Because
the court held that the defendant was not privileged from producing the
brass knuckles, the attorney to whom the defendant had delivered them
was required to comply with the subpoena duces tecum. The court stated:
[E]ven if production of the brass knuckles would involve a testi-
monial communication that the knuckles existed, that they were
the ones Authement was carrying at the time of the assault, and
that they were in his possession at the time of the subpoena, this
testimonial communication was not incriminating because it
was never used against Authement in any way.87
84. 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
85. Id at 670. In State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1979), the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that a court order requiring defendants charged with violation of
an obscenity ordinance to produce an allegedly obscene film violated their privilege against
self-incrimination. The court noted that the existence and control or possession of the film
was not a foregone conclusion because the only evidence linking any of the defendants to
the theater in which the film had been shown was an application by one of the defendants
for a state sales tax permit. The court stated that if the state did not have to rely on the act of
production to prove possesson and control it should have granted immunity to the defen-
dants from use of any evidence pertaining to production of the film, but not as to the issue
of obscenity.
86. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979); see Note, The
Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v.
United States, 95 HARV. L. REv. 683, 683-702 (1982) (for a discussion of the various ap-
proaches taken by the circuits to this problem); see also United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d
683,694 (3d Cir. 1974), affid, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
87. 607 F.2d at 1132.
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The court reached this conclusion because the brass knuckles were au-
thenticated at trial by another officer. Thejury was never told that the de-
fendant had produced the brass knuckles. Most importantly, the
production of the brass knuckles did not lead to any other evidence
against the defendant.88
Under another approach to the "implicit authentication" problem, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals compels production by an accused of his
personal records if the government grants immunity against use of the fact
of compliance with legal process. In the case of In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings United States,8 9 a hospital was under investigation for making illegal
payments to labor union officials. The appointment logs of a doctor, who
was chairman of the hospital board, were subpoenaed. The district court
quashed the subpoena on the ground that the implied authentication by
the doctor would be incriminating. Chief Justice Coffin pointed out that
in many cases "the authentication of the documents, which may be proven
by an official's testimony that he received them from the individual who
prepared and possessed them, will provide a necessary link to incriminat-
ing evidence contained in the documents." 90 The matter was remanded to
allow the government to immunize the use of the fact of the doctor's com-
pliance with the subpoena. Under the federal statute, however, this immu-
nization would not preclude subsequent use of the contents of the
appointment books, which might provide a link to incriminating evidence
in the form of reference to appointments with union officials.9'
88. Id
89. 626 F.2d 1051 (lstCir. 1980).
90. Id at 1055.
91. Id at 1059. Use immunity protects a witness only against the actual use of his
compelled testimony and evidence derived directly or indirectly from this compelled testi-
mony. Transactional immunity protects a person against all later prosecutions relating to
matters about which he testifies. People v. Sutter, 134 Cal. App. 3d, 806, 813, 184 Cal. Rptr.
829,833 (1982).
The Federal statute grants only use immunity. 18 U.S.C. §6002. In Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441,453 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that this Federal
statute was consonant with the fifth amendment:
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to com-
pel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of immunity must affordprotection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be
broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution
for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness con-
siderably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privi-
lege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently
be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being "forced to give
testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to... criminal acts." Immu-
nity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and
indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authori-
ties from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that
the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
Id The California statute permits a transactional immumty only upon request of the Dis-
trict Attorney. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324. There is also a precedent in California for a lim-
itedjudically declared use immunity. See People v. Sutter, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 814-15, 184
Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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B. Relationship toA ttorney-Client Privilege
The United States Supreme Court in Fisher ruled that documents in the
possession of an attorney are protected under the attorney-client privilege
if they are protected under the privilege against self-incrimination when
in the client's possession and are subsequently delivered to the attorney
for the purpose of legal advice.92 Since legal process had been utilized, the
Court did not deal with the question of what counsel should do with evi-
dence delivered to him by his client in the course of the attorney-client re-
lationship when no process has been served. The Court also did not decide
what the attorney should do with evidence protected under the attorney-
client privilege after he has examined it and advised the client. This article
suggests that the attorney should return the evidence to the client, who
could assert his privilege against self-incrimination in response to a sub-
poena. By returning the evidence to the client, the attorney avoids making
his office a depository for evidence pertaining to a crime and himself a po-
tential defendant in a concealment of evidence prosecution.
In People v. Swearingen,93 the Colorado Supreme Court approved the
delivery of implicating evidence by defense counsel to the prosecution be-
cause the attorney-client privilege did not apply. The accused was charged
with forgery and offering a false instrument for recording. The accused al-
legedly had added a legal description of additional real property to a deed
of trust after it had been signed by the trustor, and then recorded the deed
of trust. During the investigatory phase, the accused delivered the deed of
trust and related documents to his attorney, and his attorney handed the
documents to the prosecutor. The prosecutor made copies of the docu-
ments, retained the originals, and gave the copies to defense counsel. A
document examiner determined that the accused had altered the deed of
trust. Without any analysis other than to state that production of the doc-
uments by the attorney did not compel the defendant to be a witness
against himself, the court erroneously assumed that the documents were
not privileged under the fifth amendment in the possession of the accused.
92. 425 U.S. at 404; see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2307, at 592 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961). The Supreme Court erroneously cited Statev. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964),
along with other cases for the proposition that pre-existing documents which could have
been obtained by court process from the client may be obtained by similar process from the
attorney after transfer to him to obtain legal advice 425 U.S. at 403-04.
In United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972), the attorney, after
his client's arrest for bank robbery, went to his client's hotel room with hotel employees.
The attorney suggested that the hotel manager look in a closet. A package of $12,900 in cur-
rency was found. The manager handed it to the attorney, who delivered it to the police. The
court stated that there was"... no evidence that the attorney acquired information as to the
money by means of a confidential communication directed at aiding in defendant's de-
fense .... Any communication made for the purpose of concealing stolen money would not
be privileged." Id
93. 649 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1982).
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The court also concluded that the documents were not protected under
the attorney-client privilege because the accused had no expectation of
privacy in the deed of trust, which had been recorded.9n
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of In reJanuary 1976 Grand
Jury9 5 provides another interesting fact pattern for applying the Fisher
dual privilege analysis to a situation in which the fruits of the crime are in
the possession of an attorney. In that case, the court upheld a subpoena
duces tecum directed to an attorney for the proceeds of a bank robbery al-
legedly commited by his clients, and affirmed the attorney's contempt
conviction for noncompliance with the subpoena. 96 The threejudge panel
agreed that the fruits of the crime were not protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, but thejudges were unable to agree on a ratio-
nale. In the opinion of Judges Tone and Bauer, the money was non-testi-
monial, and even compliance by the suspects with a subpoena would not
be testimonial enough in character to invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination.97 Judge Pell, however, recognized the existence of an incrimi-
natory "implied assertion" if the client were required to produce the
money. This implied assertion was that production of the stolen money
"would furnish a link in the chain of evidence" that could lead to prosecu-
tion, as well as to evidence that an individual could reasonably believe
might be used against him in a criminal prosecution.98 Judge Pell decided,
94. Irdatl105-06.
95. 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); see Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
Client's Constitutional Rights, 6 HOFSTrRA L. REV. 693, 704-05, 710-12 (1978) (criticizing
Judge Pell for proceeding on the assumption that the defendants were guilty contrary to the
presumption of innocence). In re January 1976 Grand Jury was decided less than one
month prior to Fisher.
96. 534 F.2d at 720-21. During their investigation, FBI agents discovered that two
suspects visited Attorney Genson's law office approximately one to three hours after the
robbery, and that one suspect transferred cash to Genson's associate. Genson was served
with a subpoena duces tecum requesting production of all the money paid or delivered to
him by either of the two suspects subsequent to the time of the robbery. Genson's motion to
quash on fifth amendment, attorney-client privilege, and other grounds was denied. When
Genson refused to answer questions before the Grand Jury about his receipt of the money
from the suspects or comply with the subpoena duces tecum, he was held in civil contempt.
Id Disobedience or resistance to lawful process is punishable as a criminal contempt under
18 U.S.C. §401(3). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
97. 534 F.2d at 731. Under Judge Tone's analysis in which Judge Bauerjoined, the
money was delivered to the attorney for his fee or for safe keeping with or without his
knowledge that it was stolen. If the money was paid as a fee, the suspects had voluntarily
released it and the money itself was nontestimonial in nature. If the money was delivered
for safekeeping, it was "an act in furtherance of the crime" regardless of whether the attor-
ney knew the money was stolen. The attorney was "simply a witness to a criminal act." Id.
Judge Tone concluded: "There is no authority or reason, based on any constitutional provi-
sion or the attorney-client privilege, for shielding from judicial inquiry either the fruits of
the robbery or the fact of the later criminal act of turning over the money to appellant." Id.
98. 534 F.2d at 723,727 n.7. Judge Pell stated that the major issue was "[W]hether a
subpoena duces tecwn requiring an attorney to produce for a Grand Jury investigation mon-
ies turned over to him by his clients and believed to be proceeds of a bank robbery infringes
his clients' Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination." Id. at 722.
He found no discernible basis "... for thinking that the Fifth Amendment testimonial privi-
lege was intended to allow an attorney to suppress or secrete the physical fruits of an armed
robbery." Id at 724. Furthermore, he pointed out that the fifth amendment explicitly pro-
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however, that the attorney lacked standing to assert his client's privilege
against self-incrimination." In conclusion, the court reasoned that no at-
torney-client privilege existed in the case because matters involving re-
ceipt of fees are not privileged, and the attorney lacked standing to assert
the fifth amendment. Consequently, the attorney was under a "legal obli-
gation" to produce the money and to testify about its source, and the at-
torney's failure to do so constituted suppression of evidence."°
Under the Fisher analysis, the accused in In re January 1976 Grand Jury
would be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination from pro-
duction pursuant to a subpoena of the bank robbery proceeds in his pos-
session. He would not, however, be protected by the attorney-client
privilege from his attorney's production of the robbery proceeds in the at-
torney's possession. If, pursuant to a subpoena, the accused produced all
the money in his possession, and some of the money was identified by
bank personnel as bait money, the accused certainly would have tes-
timonially incriminated himself by producing a link in the chain of evi-
dence against himself. Although compelled production of the money by
the accused would be denied because of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, compelling the attorney to produce the money if it were in his pos-
session probably would not be prevented by assertion of the attorney-
client privilege. As courts have often stated, the office of an attorney
should not be used as a repository for the fruits of a crime."1 Possession of
bank robbery proceeds would not be necessary to the attorney's prepara-
tion of a legal defense. Furthermore, information about a fee and its pay-
ment, whether paid with legally or illegally obtained funds, is not
normally protected by the attorney-client privilege because in most cir-
cumstances, it is not a communication for the purpose of seeking legal ad-
vice nor a communication about which a client can legitimately anticipate
confidentiality.102
hibits compelling an accused to bear witness against himself; but that it does not proscribe
an incriminating statement elicited from another. Id. However, he concluded: "The recog-
nition that an attorney need not produce stolen monies in response to a subpoena would
provide a mechanism by which a member of a learned profession could become the privi-
leged repository of the fruits of a violent crime .... Whatever implied testimony arises from
the act of production is that of the lawyer .... Id at 727.
99. Id at 727. The U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher expressly did not decide whether
an attorney can assert his client's privilege against self-incrimination. 425 U.S. at 402 n.8.
See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460,467-68 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding attorney can as-
sert privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of client). But see Otwell, 394 P.2d at 686
(holding the contrary).
100. 534 F.2d at 729.
101. Ciwell, 394 P.2d at 684. Assuming that the accused's home could be watched
while an affidavit was prepared and a magistrate found, a search warrant would be the
preferrable device.
102. Phaksuan v. United States, 722 F.2d 591,592 (9th Cir. 1983); 534 F.2d at 728;
cf State v. Dawson, 89 S.W. 827, 829 (Mo. 1886) (where the court held that the kind of
money paid to the attorney by clients accused of stealing a certain amount of silver coin was
confidential and the description of services performed in an attorney's bill may be pro-
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C. State v. Olwell
In the Olwell decision, the Washington Supreme Court announced a
duty of defense counsel to turn over to the prosecution, on his own mo-
tion, evidence obtained as a result of a confidential client communication,
but the court failed to analyze thoroughly the fifth amendment implica-
tions of that duty. Under the analysis used in the Fisher decision, 10 3 if the
client's knives in Olwellhad been subpoenaed directly from him, he would
have been able to assert his privilege against self-incrimination. Other-
wise, if the client had been compelled to produce the knives pursuant to a
subpoena duces tecum, he would have implicitly authenticated the knives.
Furthermore, should a doctor testify that the victim's fatal wounds were
caused by the defendant's knife, the client by the act of production would
have forged a link in the chain of evidence against himself. Unlike in
Authement,1° however, no person other than the defendant could have au-
thenticated the knife used in the Olwell fatal stabbing because there were
no witnesses. If the prosecution had offered Olwell's client immunity in
return for production of the knives, the evidence would have been of no
probative value to the prosecution.
D. People v. Meredith
A privilege against self-incrimination problem lurks beneath the Mere-
dith exception to the attorney-client privilege. In People v. Meredith, the
California Supreme Court was not directly faced with a privilege against
self-incrimination issue because defendant Scott elected to testify to ex-
plain his apparent possession of the victim's wallet. If the Meredith excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege were to be applied in a similar fact
situation in which the accused asserts his constitutional right to remain si-
lent, the accused would in effect be denied his privilege against self-in-
crimination. The information about the location of the wallet was
testimonial in nature because Scott told his attorney about it. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however, treated the location of the wallet as physical
evidence; the court adopted the Attorney General's argument that the
tected as a confidential communication); see also, United States v. Osborn, 409 F. Supp.
406,411 (D. Ore. 1975).
103. 425 U.S. 391 (1975). The Fisher rule should not be extended to allow defense
counsel to keep a defendant's letters to his accountants or his knife from being introduced
into evidence at trial. In preparing a defense, counsel only needs time to copy the letters or
have a forensic expert examne the knife. If the letters or knives have not yet been subpoe-
naed, then defense counsel can return the items to the client. Defense counsel should not be
a repository for evidence in order to secrete that evidence from the prosecution and the trier
of fact.
104. 607 F.2d 1129(5th Cir. 1979).
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wallet "bore a tag bearing the words 'located in the trashcan by Scott's res-
idence,' and the defense by taking the wallet, destroyed this tag."105 The
Fifth Circuit approach of authentication by a third party at trial would
not eliminate the implicit authentication problem because only defendant
Scott or his attorney's investigator could authenticate the wallet's loca-
tion.
The apparent lack of sensitivity by the California Supreme Court to-
ward an accused's privilege against self-incrimination in formulating the
removal or alteration exception to the attorney-client privilege is surpris-
ing because that court has claimed to show a "more solicitous attitude" to-
ward the privilege against self-incrimination than the United States
Supreme Court.16 Certainly, in a case in which the defendant did not tes-
tify, providing the prosecution with information about the location or
condition of implicating evidence would lighten the prosecution's burden
of proof. In Prudhomme v. Superior Court,107 the California Supreme
Court held that an order requiring the defendant in a criminal prosecution
to divulge the names, addresses, and anticipated testimony of all wit-
nesses she intended to call at trial violated her federal privilege against
self-incrimination because this information possibly might incriminate
her.0 8 The court pointed out that disclosure "conceivably might lighten
the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief."' I 9 The court rea-
soned that the defense's disclosure of a witness who would testify that the
defendant acted in self-defense might lead the prosecution to the only wit-
ness to the crime and serve as a "link in a chain" of evidence tending to es-
tablish guilt of a criminal offense.10
105. 29 Cal. 3d at 694,631 P.2d at 53,175 Cal. Rptr. at 619. The court partially distin-
guished the admissibility of expert's observations in civil cases from the protection af-
forded to criminal defense attorneys observations as a result of confidential
communications from clients on the basis of the client's privilege against self- incrimina-
tion. Id at 693 n.6, 631 P.2d at 52-53 n.6, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19 n. 6.
106. Allenv. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 525,557 P.2d 65,67,134 Cal. Rptr. 774,
776(1976); CAL. CONST. art. I, §15.
107. 2 Cal. 3d 320,466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129(1970).
108. Id at 326-27, 466 P.2d at 677-78,85 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
109. Id at 326,466 P.2d at 677,85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
110. Id In ruling upon a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, the trial
court must find that it clearly appears from a consideration of all the circumstances in the
case that an answer to the challenged question cannot possibly have a tendency to incrimi-
nate the witness. Id Subsequent to the Prudhomme decision, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a trial court order compelling a defendant to disclose portions of a defense in-
vestigator's report pertaining to statements taken from prosecution witnesses. United
State v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Recognizing that the trend ofthe United States
Supreme Court on questions of compelled defense disclosure to the prosecution was not
"consistent with our interpretation of the privilege against self- incrimination," the Califor-
nia Supreme Court interpreting the California Constitution next in Allen v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976), held invalid a trial court order
compelling disclosure of the names of prospective defense and prosecution witnesses for
the purpose ofjury voir dire even though the prosecution was enjoined from contacting any
individuals named by the defense until their identity was otherwise revealed during the
trial. The California Supreme Court pointed out that even this procedure would not pre-
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III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
When an attorney does not act competently in dealing with implicating
evidence and his conduct contributes to his client's conviction, the attor-
ney will deprive his client of his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel. Although deputy public defender Cline in Morrell was found
not to have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and Scott's first at-
torney in Meredith did not render ineffective assistance of counsel under
the state of the law at the time he acted, the result might be different today
for defense counsel acting similarily. If an attorney fails to provide effec-
tive assistance of counsel, he probably also has committed malpractice,
because the standards are much alike.
The sixth amendment provides that in "all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.""' The underlying premise of this constitutional right is that
counsel will effectively assist the accused. If the assistance is not effective,
the accused has been denied a constitutional right."' Effective assistance
of counsel includes careful investigation of all defenses of fact and law
that may be available to the defendant. Careful investigation involves
conferring with the client without undue delay and as often as necessary
about developing the defense, advising the client promptly of his rights
and taking all actions necessary to preserve them, interviewing defense
and prosecution witnesses when accessible, attempting to secure informa-
tion in the possession of prosecution and law enforcement authorities,
and researching adequately." 4
The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not auto-
matically prevail over an attorney's ethical duties as an officer of the
elude investigation of other matters suggested by the names of the witnesses. As an exam-
pie, the court pointed out that if the identified witnesses were friends or relatives of the
accused an alibi defense might be anticipated and investigated. Noting that in Prudhomme
it had been more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law then
required, the California Supreme Court in Allen applied the Prudhomme test and decided
that providing names of prospective defense witnesses without their addresses did not "se-
cure the privilege against self-incrimination" as set forth in the California Constitution. Id.
at 525-26,557 P.2d at 66, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777. Interestingly, the California Supreme Court
in Allen noted that the Prudhomme standard "leaves no room for a balancing of interests"
between a trial by an unbiased jury without disruption and the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Id at 525,557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
111. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI; see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
112. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14 (1970). Both the United States
and California constitutional rights to adequate assistance of counsel are "in addition to
the general due process protection of a fair trial;... (and) focus[es] 'on the quality of the rep-
resentation provided the accused."' People v. Nation, 26 Cal. 3d 169, 178, 604 P.2d 1051,
1056,161 Cal. Rptr. 299,304 (1980). In re Williams, I Cal. 3d 168, 174,460 P.2d 984,988, 81
Cal. Rptr. 784, 788 (1969); Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 750,598 P.2d 818,
822, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662 (1979).
113. People v. Farley, 90 Cal. App. 3d 851,859, 153 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (1979).
114. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 865-66, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732,
738-39(1979).
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court. Although defense attorneys have a duty to represent their clients
zealously,' 15 one court has stated:
[T]hat duty must be met in conjunction with, rather than in op-
position to, other professional obligations. Counsel does have
an "obligation to defend with all his skill and energy, but he also
has moral and ethical obligations to the court, embodied in the
canons of ethics of the profession .... "The ethical strictures
under which an attorney acts forbid him to tender evidence or
make statements which he knows to be false as a matter of fact..
.. His activities on behalf of his client are circumscribed by the
principles and traditions of the profession .... 16
A. Morrell v. State
In Morrell, an implicating evidence case in which ineffective assistance
of counsel was an issue, the Alaska Supreme Court decided that assistance
by the attorney to the client's friend in turning over to law enforcement of-
ficials the kidnap plan drawn by the client did not violate the client's con-
stitutional right.' 7 Deputy public defender Cline represented Morrell,
who was charged with kidnapping. While Morrell was incarcerated await-
ing trial, his friend Wagner was staying at Morrell's residence. At Mor-
rell's suggestion, Wagner cleaned out Morrell's vehicle. While performing
that task, Wagner found a legal pad on which was written what appeared
to be a kidnap plan. Upon being contacted by Wagner, Deputy Public De-
fender Cline went to Morrell's residence to examine the pad. At Wagner's
request, Cline took possession of the pad, and subsequently showed it to
his client. Morrell explained he had sketched the plan while watching a re-
port on television of an earlier kidnapping."18
Unsure of his duty with respect to the implicating evidence, Cline con-
tacted other attorneys, a local judge, the American Bar Association, and
the Alaska Bar Association. The Alaska Bar Association Ethics Commit-
tee, in an advisory opinion, recommended that Cline return the evidence
to Wagner, explain to Wagner the law on concealment of evidence, and
withdraw as attorney of record if a later violation of ethical rules would
occur. 119
115. People v. Cropper, 89 Cal. App. 3d 716,720-21, 152 Cal. Rptr. 555,557 (1979).
116. Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429,437-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
117. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210-12 (Alaska 1978).
118. Id at 1206-07. Morrell was also charged with forcible rape and assault with in-
tent to commit rape.
119. Id. at 1206; Brief of Appellee at 7 (available through interlibrary loan on
microfiche from Inter Library Department, Alaska Court Libraries, 303 "K ' Street,
Anchorage, Alaska 99501). D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES & MATERIALS
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After withdrawing as attorney of record, Cline assisted Wagner in turn-
ing over the pad to law enforcement officials. Morrell's subsequent coun-
sel moved to suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied. The pad
was introduced into evidence at trial. Since the evidence was obtained
from a non-agent third party, Cline was required to testify about how he
had obtained the pad. A handwriting expert testified that Morrell had
outlined the kidnap plan. 120
The Alaska Supreme Court decided that Cline's assistance to Wagner
in delivering the tablet to law enforcement personnel did not violate his
client's sixth amendment right because Cline acted competently. The
Alaska two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test was: (1) whether
counsel's performance fell below what would be expected of a lawyer with
ordinary training and skill in criminal law, and (2) whether that ineffec-
tive performance in some way contributed to the client's conviction.12 1
The court considered three issues in applying the first prong of the test.
First, the court analyzed the implicating evidence decisions and con-
cluded that the general rule was that "a criminal defense attorney must
turn over to the prosecution real evidence that the attorney obtains from
his client."'" Second, the court determined that Cline's testimony about
the kidnap plan did not violate the attorney-client privilege because Wag-
ner was not Morrell's agent. Third, the court decided that Cline "could
have reasonably concluded" that the Alaska concealment of evidence
statute required him to reveal the existence of the evidence. 123
Even if the Alaska Supreme Court had found that Cline did not act
competently, the court probably would have concluded under the second
prong of the test that Cline's action did not contribute to the conviction of
Morrell and would have denied the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on that basis. The principal witnesses were the victim and the defendant.
Ample independent evidence supported the victim's testimony. As the
victim testified, both interior door handles in Morrell's pickup truck and
the window crank on the passenger side were missing or inoperative,
which prevented her escape. Upon her release, the victim had bruises cir-
cling both ankles which could have been caused by being tied with rope.
When the accused's home was searched pursuant to a search warrant, sev-
eral items were found that confirmed the victim's testimony, including
magazines with address labels torn out, a disconnected telephone exten-
ON EVIDENCE 608-11 (3d ed. 1976) (correspondence between Deputy Public Defender
Cline and the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee).
120. 575 P.2d at 1207.
121. Risherv. State, 523 P.2d 421,425 (Alaska 1974); Green v. State, 579 P.2d 14, 15-
16 (Alaska 1978).
122. 575P.2dat 1210.
123. Id at 1211 n.17; seeinfranotes 172-74.
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sion, clothes of the type the victim claimed she had been provided by the
defendant, and pieces of rope.12 4
If a case with facts similar to Morrell were to be decided today on the in-
effective assistance of counsel issue, the court would probably find that
the attorney did not act competently, but would not reverse on the ground
of ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant would still be
convicted without the pad being admitted into evidence. After Morrell, a
defense attorney taking possession of the pad would not act competently
because he should be aware of the general rule about turning over evi-
dence in counsel's possession. Instead of taking possession of the pad, de-
fense counsel should have the pad examined by an investigator without
removing or altering it, perhaps have the pad photographed, and then dis-
cuss with his client the importance of the pad to the defense. No tactical
advantage is gained by taking possession of the pad for submission to a
handwriting analyst before discussing with the client its significance. If
defense counsel has the evidence examined without taking possession and
discusses the evidence with his client, counsel will not be in the position of
being required to assist in turning over to law enforcement officials evi-
dence that might be harmful to his client's defense.
B. People v. Meredith
Scott's first attorney in Meredith did not render ineffective assistance of
counsel because his actions in having the wallet retrieved and delivered to
the police were reasonably competent under the law in 1976. When the at-
torney took this action, he reasonably could have thought that the prose-
cution under Olwell could not have ascertained the location of the
evidence from the defense. The California two-prong test for ineffective
assistance of counsel is (1) whether counsel failed to act in a manner ex-
pected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates,
and (2) whether his conduct resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially
meritorious defense.125 Even though a defense has not been withdrawn,
124. 575 P.2d at 1202-04.
125. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424-25, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732,
739 (1979). An example of not reasonably competent conduct in the investigatory phase of
a criminal defense is the failure to locate witnesses other than defendant's immediate fam-
ily to corroborate his statement that he could not speak Spanish when the robbery victim
testified that the robbers were speaking Spanish. People v. Rodriguez, 73 Cal. App. 3d
1023, 1032, 141 Cal. Rptr. 118,123-24 (1977). The United States Supreme Court in dictum
has posited an objective standard for effective assistance of counsel as being "... within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759,771 (1970). The Ninth Circuit standard is "reasonably competent and effec-
tive representation," and if the claim of ineffective assistance is founded upon specific acts
and ommissions of defense counsel at trial, the accused must establish that counsel's errors
prejudiced the defense. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1327, (9th Cir. 1978). "De-
fense counsel's errors or omissions must reflect a failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or
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the second prong of the test is satisfied if a reasonable probability exists
that the client would have received a more favorable determination but
for counsel's incompetence.126
Should a case with facts similar to Meredith be decided today by the
California Supreme Court on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue,
the client would probably prevail. After Meredith, a California attorney,
by taking possession of the wallet in similar circumstances without con-
sultation with his client, would fail to act with reasonable competence
under the first prong of the test. Counsel should know that the incriminat-
ing evidence will have to be delivered to law enforcement authorities and
information about its location or condition crucial to the defense will have
to be disclosed. If defense counsel's purpose was to verify that the wallet
belonged to the victim, competent counsel would direct the investigator to
examine the identification items in the wallet without removing or alter-
ing them. If the wallet was subsequently discovered and secured by law
enforcement, the defendant would have access to the wallet through crim-
inal discovery procedures.2 7
Assuming that an attorney taking possession of the Meredith wallet to-
day would be acting incompetently, the second prong of the test would be
satisfied because Scott probably would have been acquitted if the wallet
had not been turned over to law enforcement officials, had not been ad-
mitted into evidence, and if the investigator had not testified about its lo-
cation. The police probably would not have searched further for that
evidence because Scott's residence already had been searched pursuant to
a warrant, and the wallet had not been found. In his statement to the po-
lice prior to his arrest, Scott did not mention the wallet. Other evidence
diligence of a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney-they must be errors a rea-
sonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have
made.... Ii at 1330. Prejudice"... may result from the cumulative impact of multiple de-
ficiencies... [and] the requirement that prejudice appear does not mean that relief is avail-
able only if the defendant would have been acquitted but for counsel's blunder." Id. at
1333.
126. People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr.
855,862 (1983). AlthoughPope involved a failure to assert the defense of diminished capac-
ity, subsequent appellate decisions found ineffective assistance of counsel even though the
attorney's incompetence did not constitute withdrawal of an actual defense. In Fosselman,
the prosecution committed misconduct, which the California Supreme Court concluded
was not harmless, and defense counsel failed to object to this misconduct. Since the convic-
tion "turned largely on the respective credibility" of the victim and defendant, the supreme
court found that it "is reasonablyprobable that a result more favorable to defendant would
have occurred had the prosecutor refrained from the offensive conduct." Thejudgment was
reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to reconsider defendant's motion
for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 580-81, 659 P.2d at
1148-49, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60. "In cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is based on acts or ommissions not amounting to withdrawal of a defense, a defen-
dant may prove such ineffectiveness if he establishes.., that it is reasonably probable that a
determination more favorable to the defendant would have resulted in the absence of coun-
sel's failings." Id at 584, 659 P.2d at 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
127. Seesupra note 3 and accompaning text.
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against Scott was weak. Meredith did not implicate Scott in the crime be-
cause Meredith relied on an alibi defense. Jacqueline Otis, who originally
was charged as a co-defendant on the conspiracy count but who testified
for the prosecution in return for an eventual dismissal of charges, also did
not implicate Scott. She testified that the victim suggested that she walk
with him to his car. The only witness implicating Scott at trial was Laurie
Sam, a pregnant thirteen year old girl of limited intelligence, and her trial
testimony contradicted her preliminary hearing testimony, which had not
implicated Scott.2 8
Without the location of the wallet in evidence, Scott probably could
have successfully defended the conspiracy count by asserting his privilege
against self-incrimination and discrediting the testimony of Laurie Sam.
As the California Supreme Court pointed out, to "support the theory of
conspiracy the prosecution sought to show the place where the victim's
wallet was found, and, in the course of the case this piece of evidence be-
came crucial."2 9 After the investigator testified that he had found the wal-
let behind Scott's residence, Scott had to make a Hobson's choice between
waiving his privilege against self-incrimination and explaining his appar-
ent possession of the wallet, or not testifying and risking that the jury
would draw an unfavorable inference from his apparent possession of the
wallet. Scott believed that he had to testify to overcome Laurie Sam's tes-
timony that she overheard him tell Otis to lead the victim to his car so
Meredith could "knock him in the head." Scott admitted on the stand that
he had originally agreed to participate in the robbery, but claimed that he
had "backed out" because his fingerprints were on the victim's car and he
was afraid the police would discover them. Scott also admitted that after
the shooting and after Meredith left the crime scene he removed the vic-
tim's wallet. Confronted with the wallet in evidence and the investigator's
testimony about its location, Scott's defense was that he did not partici-
pate in the conspiracy to rob the victim, and that when he later took the
wallet, he was only guilty of theft or as an accesscry after the fact, but not
of robbery. 30
128. Appellant's Opening Brief, filed December 16, 1977, at 8 (on file at California
Supreme Court 350 McAllister St., San Francisco, CA 94102); People v. Meredith, 29 Cal.
3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
129. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at685-86,631 P.2dat48,175 Cal. Rptr.,at614.
130. Appellant's Opening Brief, at p.26. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 682,631 P.2d at 646,
175 Cal. Rptr. at 612. "Hobson's choice: This or nothing; a choice with no alternative; in
allusion to the practice of Thomas Hobson, 1544-1631, English Liveryman, who required
each customer to take the horse nearest the door." FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW COMPRE-
HENSIVE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1973).
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C. In re January 1976 Grand Jury
The issue of whether ineffective assistance of counsel results when an
attorney produces implicating evidence received from a client in response
to a subpoena duces tecum has not been decided. In the case of In reJanu-
ary 1976 Grand Jury,'3 the attorney was served with a subpoena duces te-
cum for any money he had received from two clients, both of whom were
suspected of a bank robbery. The attorney argued that the prosecution's
attempt to subpoena him and make him the source of evidence against his
clients impermissibly infringed upon their right to counsel. The prosecu-
tion argued that the defendants had no right to particular counsel and that
the attorney could be replaced by equally competent counsel. Judge Pell
recognized that compliance by the attorney with a subpoena duces tecum
might "place him in the position of being a source of evidence against ei-
ther or both of his clients."' 32 Thejudge expressed no opinion on the issue
of whether the defendants, after having made the attorney a witness to
their crime, could properly invoke the sixth amendment to bar the attor-
ney's eyewitness testimony at trial. Judge Tone indicated, however, that
"to ask that question is almost to answer it."'133
D. Malpractice
When an accused has a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he
may also have a valid malpractice cause of action. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit has stated that "the legal standards for ineffective assistance of
counsel in... criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice... are equiv-
alent."134 The competence prong of the California ineffective assistance of
counsel test is very similar to the duty of care element in an action for at-
torney malpractice. A California attorney has the duty to apply ordinary
131. 534F.2d719(1976).
132. Id at 729. Judge Pell found that the right to counsel issue was too premature for
consideration at the time of the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoena and prior to
any other hearing. I, at 730. In State v. Sullivan, 373 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1962), defense coun-
sel and approximately twenty law enforcement personnel were present when the murder
victim's body and the murder weapon were discovered and photographed. The prosecuting
attorney sought to cross-examine defense counsel about this phase of the crimnal investi-
gation. The court concluded that defense counsel's testimony was "repetitious and not nec-
essary to the state's case in the interest ofjustice and the protection of the public" which
tilted the balance in the defendant's favor. The court concluded that defense counsel, as an
unwilling witness for the state, "rendered his services less effective and invaded the ac-
cused's right to unhampered representation at the trial." Ic, at 478. One potential limita-
tion on counsel testifying about implicating evidence is that defense counsel should not be
called to testify if there are numerous other witnesses so that his testimony would be repeti-
tive, and the probaive value of his testimonyis substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. CAL. EVID. CODE
§352.
133. 534F.2dat731.
134. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606,609 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
1984 / Incriminating Criminal Evidence
care and skill, reasonable diligence, and his best judgment in his profes-
sional employment. When an attorney fails to fulfill this duty, he is negli-
gent.'35An attorney, however, is not liable for an error ofjudgment as long
as the error is not attributable to negligence.136 The other elements of legal
malpractice are that in the absence of the attorney's negligence a more
favorable result would have been obtained, and that as a result, the client
has been damaged. 137
In Meredith, when Scott's first attorney sent the investigator to pick up
the victim's wallet, that attorney did not commit malpractice. Scott's first
attorney could not be held responsible for failing to foresee an unexpected
development in the law. 138 In 1976, applicable case law indicated that a
defense attorney could take possession of physical evidence for a reasona-
ble period of time and then should deliver the evidence to law enforce-
ment officials. The cases indicated, however, that the prosecution should
not disclose the source of that evidence.139 A clever defense counsel at that
time might have thought that by turning over the evidence he might re-
move a link in the chain of evidence to his client because he could not be
identified as the source of the evidence that hdd been produced. In 1976, it
was unforseeable that the California Supreme Court in the 1981 case of
Meredith would extend the Qiwell rule and judicially create an exception
to the statutory attorney-client privilege, thereby formulating a unique
and unprecedented rule.
After Meredith, when a California criminal defense attorney removes
evidence without a good tactical reason and delivers it to law enforcement
135. BAJI 6.37; see Lakoff v. Lionel Corporation, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806,808-09 (1955).
The court held that a client stated a cause of action against his patent attorney for disclosing
allegedly confidential information from the client to another client. I
136. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 358-59, 530 P.2d 589, 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,
627(1975).
137. Apparently in California the client does not have to establish that he was inno-
cent of the crime for which he was prosecuted in order to prevail in a legal malpractice ac-
tion. In Martinv. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1971), the defendant pleaded
guilty to misdemeanors of disturbing the peace and carrying a concealed weapon in a vehi-
cle. He commenced serving a 30 day jail sentence. Then in connection with the same inci-
dent he was charged with the felonies of assault with a deadly weapon and discharging a
firearm into an inhabited dwelling. His attorney arranged with the trial court for psychiat-
ric care, rather than incarceration, but he failed to appear at the sentencing hearing and was
convicted and imprisoned for about four years. His attorney failed to raise the defenses of
multiple prosecution and multiple punishment under California Penal Code section 654.
The client won a $20,000 malpracticejudgment, but it was reversed because the trial court
erroneously did not rule as a matter of law which defenses were legally available at the time
of the criminal trial. Id at 417-19,427-28, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 731-33, 739.
138. Ruchti v. Goldfein, 113 Cal. App. 3d 928, 934, 170 Cal. Rptr. 375, 378 (1980)(Hrg. denied Feb. 18, 1981). The court stated: "We do not believe any attorney should be
held to have foreseen the 180 degree shift in thelawin this area." Id at 934, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
378.
139. Scott's first attorney hired independent counsel to prepare and argue a motion
to suppress introduction of the wallet or testimony by Scott's first attorney or the investiga-
tor about the location of the wallet. The principal authority relied on was State v. Olwell,
394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964). People v. Scott, Sacramento Municipal Court file no. 31738F(on file at Sacramento County Courthouse, 720-9th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
officials, the attorney may have committed malpractice. If the location of
the evidence is crucial to the conviction of his client and the attorney must
disclose that location, he will have acted negligently by removing the evi-
dence. In a factual situation similar to Meredith, the client might be able to
prove that but for the turning over of the evidence and the disclosure of its
location, he would have been acquitted."4°
IV. IMPERMISSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION ANALYSIS
One commentator has argued that the Olwell turnover rule and the
Meredith exception to the attorney-client privilege create a constitution-
ally impermissible tension between the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to effective assistance of counsel. This com-
mentator believes that requiring defense counsel to turn over the evidence
and divulge its location compels the accused to choose between telling or
not telling his attorney about the existence and location of the evidence. If
the accused tells the attorney, who then removes or alters the evidence,
turns the evidence over to law enforcement officials, and divulges its loca-
tion or condition, the accused in effect, is denied his privilege against self-
incrimination. If the accused does not tell his attorney and the attorney
therefore cannot fully investigate the defense, the accused is denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 141 This commentator's argument, however, is
currently of doubtful legal validity and ignores some of the practicalities
of criminal defense representation.
A. Simmons v. United States
The constitutionally impermissible tension analysis derives from the
United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons v. United States.142 In
140. Three principal defenses are available in a legal malpractice action. First, if the
defendant unsuccessfully raised the same error in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a
motion for a writ of error coram nobis, he would be collaterally estopped. McCord, 636 F.2d
at 610. Collateral estoppel "prohibits parties who have litigated one cause of action from re-
litigating in a second and different cause of action matters of fact which were, or necessarily
must have been, determined in the first litigation." Id at 608. Scott filed a writ of error
coram nobis with the California Supreme Court (copy on file at California State Archives,
1020 - "0" Street, Sacramento, CA. 95814). Secondly, if the client inaccurately or incom-
pletely disclosed information upon which the attorney decided to take possession of the ev-
idence, the defense of contributory negligence would be available. Martin, 20 Cal. App. 3d
at 428,97 Cal. Rptr. at 739. Thirdly, if the client due to his own misconduct, was denied pa-
role or placed under more severe restrictions in his place of incarceration, he would have
failed to mitigate damages. Id
141. Note, People v. Meredith: TheAttorney-ClientPrivilegeandthe CriminalDefen-
dant's ConstitutionalRights, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1048, 1051-64 (1982); see also Comment, Ex-
tending the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate, 13 PAC. L.J. 437, 437-57
(1982).
142. 390 U.S. 377(1968).
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Simmons, the defendant was indicted for bank robbery. Without a war-
rant, evidence was seized from a suitcase found in the basement of a house
belonging to the mother of the defendant's friend. In support of a motion
to suppress this evidence on fourth amendment grounds, the defendant
testified that the suitcase belonged to him. The motion to suppress was de-
nied. At trial, the defendant's testimony about his ownership of the suit-
case was introduced by the prosecution. After his conviction, the
defendant contended on appeal that admission of his suppression motion
testimony at trial on the issue of guilt forced him to waive his privilege
against self-incrimination for the opportunity to raise a fourth amend-
ment claim. Justice Harlan, the author of the majority opinion, wrote:
[The defendant] was obliged either to give up what he believed
... to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one con-
stitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no ob-
jection.143
Several courts have followed Simmons, and consequently, have also found
a constitutionally impermissible tension in forcing a defendant to choose
between his constitutional rights.'
The Simmons impermissible tension analysis, however, has been lim-
ited by a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision. In McGautha
v. California,145 the Court held that a unitary murder trial does not create
an impermissible tension between the defendant's fourteenth amendment
due process right to be heard on the issue of punishment and his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the issue of guilt. The
defendant argued that the unitary trial deprived him of his right to be
heard on the extent of his punishment without having his testimony on
that issue used against him in the guilt phase of the trial. In the majority
opinion in McGautha, Justice Harlan, who also wrote the majority opin-
ion in Simmons, stated "[t]o the extent that its [Simmons] rationale was
based on a 'tension' between constitutional rights. . ., the validity of that
reasoning must now be regarded as open to question."'" In another case
143. maat 394.
144. See United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1977); Wehling v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1979).
145. 402U.S. 183(1971).
146. Id at 212. One commentator has distinguished McGautha from Simmons on
three grounds: (1) Simmons involved a conflict between two provisions of the Bill of
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in which the Court found the choice between constitutional rights accept-
able, the United States Supreme Court stated that the Constitution [does
not] forbid ".. .every government-imposed choice in the criminal process
that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." 47
B. Criticism
Even if the impermissible constitutional tension doctrine is still legally
viable, it is of limited practical applicability in the implicating evidence
context. First, most criminal defendants are probably unaware of ten-
sions between their constitutional rights, and will not be influenced by the
possibility of such a tension in communicating with their attorneys. Sec-
ond, competent defense counsel will not automatically take possession of,
remove, or alter the implicating evidence and turn it over to law enforce-
ment officials, nor disclose its location or condition. As previously dis-
cussed, a competent attorney would have the evidence examined by an
investigator without removing or altering it, discuss with the client the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of removing the evidence and testing it, and
decide with the client what action to take. Whether to remove evidence
that must then be turned over to the prosecution and its location and con-
dition divulged is a tactical decision.'48 The impermissible constitutional
tension doctrine is of limited applicability for a third reason. In Meredith,
the California Supreme Court suggested a stipulation procedure that in
most cases avoids an impermissible tension between the defendant's exer-
cise of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. The court stated that the
prosecution and defense should stipulate to the presentation of the evi-
dence and testimony about its location in a manner that would not forge
an incriminating link in the chain of evidence to the defendant through
the attorney or investigator. 4 9 Fourth, the defendant, if convicted be-
cause of incompetence by his counsel in removing or altering, and disclos-
ing the location or condition of evidence, can assert on appeal a violation
of his right to effective assistance of counsel. 15 0
Rights; (2) the court in McGautha decided in substance that the unitary trial did not violate
either the fifth or fourteenth amendment; (3) if a tension existed in McGautha, it involved a
mid-trial choice between constitutional rights that is caused by the strength of the prosecu-
tion case, while Simmons involved a pretrial choice between constitutional rights that is
caused by rules or procedures. Note, supra note 141, at 1056 n.47. See Westen, Incredible
Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture ofAnother, 66 IOWA L.
REv. 741,741-75 (1981).
147. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,30 (1973).
148. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 695,631 P.2dat54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at620.
149. Id. at 695 n.8, 631 P.2d at 54 n.8, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620 n.8.
150. See Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1206.
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V. CRIMES
In dealing with implicating evidence, California defense counsel may
commit one or more of several crimes. Defense counsel must be careful
not to conceal evidence, or conspire with the client to conceal evidence.
Depending on his advice or conduct, the attorney may also become an ac-
cessory to the crime. Although the attorney does not take possession of ev-
idence from a third party, he may be guilty of conspiring to withhold
information, depending on the advice he gives to the third party. When his
client is charged with theft, burglary, or a similar crime, the attorney can
be convicted of receipt of stolen property if he takes possession of the pil-
fered items. Moreover, when examining evidence, the attorney and his in-
vestigator must be careful not to alter it so as to commit the crime of
tampering with evidence.
A. Destruction or Concealment of Evidence
California Penal Code section 135 provides that any person who
wilfully destroys or conceals a specified type of writing or "other matter or
thing," knowing it is about to be produced as evidence in any investiga-
tion, inquiry, or trial, and intending to prevent its production, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. 15' The language "other matter or thing" in the statute has
been interpreted to include contraband, 152 narcotics, 153 weapons, 15 4 pho-
tographs, and other physical evidence.155
151.
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or
other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evidence upon any trial, inquiry,
or investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully destroys or conceals the
same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, is guilty of a misde-
meanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 135.
152. People v. Fields, 105 Cal. App. 3d 341, 343, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336,337 (1980). Al-
though the heading of Penal Code section 135 refers to "destroying orconcealing documen-
tary evidence," section headings in the Penal Code are not "deemed to govern, limit,
modify or in any manner affect the scope, meaning or intent of the... section." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 10004. California penal statutes are to be construed "... according to the fair im-
port of their terms, with a view to effect (their) objects and to promotejustice." CAL. PENAL
CODE §4.
A statute is to be given a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance
with its apparent purpose and the intent of the Legislature-one that is practical
rather than technical and that will lead to a wise policy rather than to mischief or an
absurdity .... The legislative intent should be gathered from the whole statute
rather than from isolated parts or words. All of the parts should be construed to-
gether if possible without doing violence to the language or spirit of the statute.
105 Cal. App. 3d 341,343-49, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336,337-38 (1980).
153. People v. Mijares, 6 Cal. 3d 415, 491 P.2d 1115,99 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1971).
154. People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 403, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678, 679-81 (1972)
(gun); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514,83 Cal. Rptr. 715,722(1970) (shoes worn by defen-
dant in kicking victim).
155. People v. Superior Court (Reilly), 53 Cal. App. 3d 40, 125 Cal. Rptr. 504, 511(1975) (photographic material, wallet and check container).
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The knowledge and wilfullness required for a violation of Penal Code
section 135 do not include knowledge of the statute or a specific intent to
violate the statute. "Knowingly" connotes only knowledge that facts exist
which bring the act within the statute; knowledge of the unlawfulness of
the act is not required. 56 "Wilfully" implies an intent or willingness to
commit the act of destruction or concealment, not any intent to violate the
statute.1
57
Whether an item is "about to be produced in evidence" so that its de-
struction or concealment will violate California Penal Code section 135
requires "an immediacy or temporal closeness."' 58 The statute applies to
evidence that is to be produced in any "investigation whatever," even
though formal legal proceedings have not been commenced. For example,
the seizure and examination of marijuana by an officer in ajail is a suffi-
cient investigation because it must be presumed the evidence would be
used in a future prosecution. 5 9 The statute also applies when a counter-
feiter in fear of imminent disclosure or arrest tries to hide his work prod-
uct from approaching officers; 6' when officers are enroute with a search
warrant;'61 and when a defendant, already charged with a crime, tells
someone to dispose of the evidence. 62 In contrast, one court has stated
that the statute should not apply to the disposal of drugs prior to the com-
mencement of any police investigation.' 63 Another court has held the stat-
ute does not apply to defendants who, shortly after the crime, burned
clothes worn by them during commission of the crime.' 64
The term "destroy" has not been defined by a California court in con-
struing Penal Code section 135. Generally, "to destroy" means to "tear
156. CAL. PENAL CODE §7(5); In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362,497 P.2d 807,102 Cal. Rptr.
335(1972).
157. CAL. PENAL CODE §7(1).
158. Peoplev. Prysock, 127 Cal. App. 3d 972, 1000,180 Cal. Rptr. 15,31(1982).
The statute requires that the actor know that the object is about to be produced in
evidence. We conclude that whatever the statute's exact meaning, the evidence
herein falls short because the prosecution failed to show that any law enforcement
investigation in fact had started and/or that law enforcement was or would be
looking for the particular item. Unless this or a similar limiting interpretation is
given, the statue would appear virtually open ended, at least in all but 'victimless'
crimes.
Id at 1001, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
159. Peoplev. Fields, 105 Cal. App. 3d 341,345.46, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336,339 (1980).
160. People v. Superior Court (Reilly), 53 Cal. App. 3d 40, 48-49, 125 Cal. Rptr. 504,
508-11 (1975) (police officer looking through a motel window saw defendant's confederate
working with a camera and drivers license and after officers announced their presence, de-
fendant was seen hiding a wallet and what appeared to be a travelers check container).
161. Prysock, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
162. Peoplev. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397,402-03, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678,680-82 (1972).
163. People v. Fields, 105 Cal. App. 3d 341, 346 n.4, 491 P.2d 1115, 1119-20 n.4, 164
Cal. Rptr. 336,339-40 n.4. In People v. Mijares, 6 Cal. 3d 415,422,491 P.2d 1115,99 Cal.
Rptr. 139 (1971), the defendant leaned inside a parked car, removed an object, and threw it
into a nearby field, while being watched by a witness.
164. Prysock, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
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down, wrench apart, knock or pull to pieces."' 65 However, a New York
court, construing a statute similar to Penal Code section 135, held that dis-
assembling a murder weapon and burying it constituted concealment, not
destruction.166 The California Supreme Court in Meredith did not discuss
Penal Code section 135, but gave the meaning of destruction of evidence a
unique twist in the context of the attorney-client privilege. The court
stated that barring admission of testimony concerning the original condi-
tion and location of evidence altered or removed by an accused's attorney
would in effect permit the defense "to 'destroy' critical information be-
cause the prosecution would be deprived of the opportunity to observe the
evidence in its original condition or location."167
California courts have construed the word "conceal" to require affirm-
ative conduct. The word "conceal" pertains to affirmative action likely to
prevent or intended to prevent knowledge of fact; the act of concealment
results in some advantage to the concealing party or disadvantage to an
interested party from whom the fact is withheld.168 If a person requests the
opportunity to consult an attorney for advice about whether or not to pro-
duce evidence, however, he has not concealed evidence. 161
Apparently, delivery of evidence to an attorney and his possession of it
for a reasonable period of time in preparing a defense does not constitute
concealment of evidence under California Penal Code section 135. In
165. George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414,416, 150 P. 73, 76-77 (1915). Flushing
the evidence down a toilet constitutes destruction of evidence. People v. Fields, 105 Cal.
App. 3d at 347, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
166. People v. DeFelice, 282 App. Div. 514, 125 N.Y.S.2d 80,82 (1953).
167. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 694,631 P.2d at 53,175 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
168. Mitchell v. Locutro, 79 Cal. App. 2d 507, 514, 179 P.2d 848, 851 (1947). The
common definition of conceal is to"... hide or withdraw from observation; to cover or keep
from sight." It does not necessarily mean that the object may not be located or found by
reasonable means of discovery. People v. One 1940 Oldsmobile Coupe, 80 Cal. App. 2d
372, 376-77, 181 P.2d 950, 952 (1947) (placing a case of liquor on a small back seat of a
locked coupe effectively withdrew it from observation and constituted a concealment
under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act); People v. Nicholas, 403 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684(1978) (moving a murder victim's body in order to prevent the murderer's detection by law
enforcement authorities held to be concealment under the New York suppression of evi-
dence statute); see also People v. Eddington, 201 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576-77, 20 Cal. Rptr.
122, 124 (1962).
169. People v. Edgar, 60 Cal. 2d 171,383 P.2d 449,32 Cal. Rptr. 41(1963). Ajailer
overheard a prisoner tell his mother to hide pictures which might be important to his de-
fense. When the mother arrived home, she was met by two police officers. They asked her
for the pictures. The mother said that she did not know what she should do and that she
thought she should contact an attorney. After being told several times that if she did not
turn over the pictures she would bebooked for withholding evidence, the mother found the
pictures and gave them to the officers. In discussing the contention that the pictures were
obtained illegally, Justice Traynor concluded that the mother neither violated nor at-
tempted to violate Penal Code section 135. The "mother did no more than return home
from thejail. At most the officers had reasonable cause to believe that she intended to vio-
late section 135 in the future. She obviously did not intend to hide or attempt to hide the pic-
tures in their presence. It is equally clear that she did not conceal the pictures within the
meaning of the statute by her initial refusal to give them to the officers." Id at 174, 383 P.2d
at 451, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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People v. Lee,'70 the accused's wife turned over the instrumentality of the
crime to the public defender's office. Upon being relieved as attorney of
record, the deputy public defender with the agreement of the deputy dis-
trict attorney delivered the evidence to a municipal court judge. The ap-
pellate court noted that an accused may not "permanently sequester
physical evidence" by delivering it to his attorney. The court quoted Penal
Code section 135, but did not indicate that the deputy public defender's
actions violated that statute. The court also approvingly quoted the dicta
in Olwell that the attorney may retain evidence for a reasonable period of
time in preparation of a defense, but then on his own motion must turn the
evidence over to the prosecution. 171
While a California court has not thoroughly analyzed Penal Code sec-
tion 135 in connection with an attorney's possession or knowledge of im-
plicating evidence, the Alaska Supreme Court in Morrell specifically, but
incorrectly, analyzed a similar statute in this context. The Alaska statute
provided criminal penalties for a person who wilfully destroyed, con-
cealed, or altered evidence relating to the commission of a crime or evi-
dence being sought for production during an investigation, inquiry, or
trial with the intent to prevent its discovery or production. 72 The Alaska
Supreme Court found that the deputy public defender "could have rea-
sonably concluded" that this statute "required him to reveal the exis-
tence" of the kidnap plan.73 The court stated:
While statutes which address the concealing of evidence are
generally construed to require an affirmative act of concealment
in addition to the failure to disclose information to the authori-
ties, taking possession of evidence from a non-client third party
and holding the evidence in a place not accessible to investigat-
ing authorities would seem to fall within the statute's ambit.
170. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514,83 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1970).
171. Iad at526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at722.
172. ALASKA STAT. §11.30.315 (repealed effective January 1, 1978). "A person who
wilfully destroys, alters or conceals evidence concerning the commission of a crime or evi-
dence which is being sought for production during an investigation, inquiry or trial, with
the intent to prevent the evidence from being discovered or produced, is guilty of a misde-
meanor. ... " Cf ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610(a)(1) (Supp. 1978) (which prohibits destruction
of evidence regardless of the time of the act).
173. 575 P.2d at 1211-12.
174. Id. at 1212. The court did not cite cases from any jurisdiction construing stat-
utes similar to the Alaska concealment of evidence statute, such as California Penal Code
section 135, to require an affirmative act of concealment. The court cited federal cases con-
struing the federal misprision statute to require an affirmative act of concealment in addi-
tion to a failure to disclose a crime to the proper authorities. "Whoever, having knowledge
of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to somejudge or other person in civil
or military authority under the United States..." is guilty of a misprision. 18 U.S.C. §4. The
elements of misprision are: (1) one or more of the principals had committed and completed
the described crime; (2) defendant had full knowledge of that fact; (3) defendant failed to
notify the authorities; and (4) defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the crime.
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No evidence existed of any intent by deputy public defender Cline to pre-
vent discovery of the pad on which the kidnapping plan had been printed.
Actually, Cline kept the pad only a short period of time before returning it
to his client's friend, Wagner. Cline returned the pad to Wagner while at
the defendant's residence, and after law enforcement officials had failed
to find the pad when conducting a search pursuant to a warrant. Although
Wagner wanted to leave the Fairbanks area to work on the Alaska pipe-
line, no evidence was produced to indicate he intended to destroy or con-
ceal the pad.175
B. Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice
Even though obstruction of justice is not a crime in California, conspir-
acy to obstruct justice is a statutory crime. 176 Specifically, it is a crime for
two or more persons to conspire ".... to pervert or obstruct justice, or the
due administration of the laws." 77 Conspiracies that fit within this statute
include conspiracies to destroy or conceal evidence, bribe witnesses, com-
mit perjury, falsify evidence, and compound or conceal a crime.7 8
C. Accessory
If a California attorney assists a client in concealing evidence of a fel-
ony, he may be convicted as an accessory to the felony. Every person who
United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694,695 (9th Cir. 1968). Common law misprison of felony
is "the concealment of a felony which a man knows, but never assented to; for, if he as-
sented, this makes him either principal or accessory." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
121 (1st Ed. 1903). Misprision of felony is not a crime in California.
175. Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1203-04, 1207.
176. See Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756,766,343 P.2d 118, 124(1959) (con-
cealing or withholding documentary evidence was a common law crime of obstruction ofjustice).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(5). Usually, "conduct which constitutes an offense
against publicjustice, or the administration of law includes... anything done by a personin
hindering or obstructing an officer in the performance of his official obligations ....
Lorensen v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49,59,216 P.2d 859, 865 (1950). Unlike under the
federal obstruction ofjustice statute, an "evil or corrupt motive" is not required in Califor-
nia. Peoplev. Saugstad, 203 Cal. App. 2d 536,542,21 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1962).Thefederal ob-
struction ofjustice statute encompasses anyone who"... corruptly or by threats or force, or
by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeav-
ors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the dueadministrationofjustice .... 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
Anyone who intentionally withholds or destroys tangible evidence, which he knows to be
the target of a grand jury investigation can reasonably be said to be one "who corruptly...
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administra-
ton of ustie." United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 1975).
178. Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 216 P.2d 859(1950); Davis v. Supe-
rior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 16, 345 P.2d 513(1959); People v. Martin, 135 Cal. App. 3d
710,721, 185 Cal. Rptr. 556,562(1982). See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 134, 135, 137, 138, 153.
People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290,524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1974); Feagles v. Supe-
rior Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 735,90 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1970). Conviction of obstruction ofjus-
rice is a crime involving moral turpitude which results in disbarment. See, e.g., In re Craig,
12 Cal. 2d 93, 82 P.2d 442 (1938).
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knowingly aids the perpetrator of a felony with intent that the criminal
avoid or escape arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, is an accessory to
the felony. 179
Attorneys in Virginia and Texas have been found to be accessories to
crimes because of their actions with respect to implicating evidence. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of In re Ryder80 stated that at-
torney Ryder became an accessory after the fact when he transferred a
weapon and bank robbery proceeds from his client's safe deposit box to
an adjacent box in his own name. If the authorities located his box, Ryder
planned to assert the attorney-client privilege and break the chain of evi-
dence to his client.' The court stated: "Ryder made himself an active
participant in a criminal act, obstensibly wearing the mantle of the loyal
advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact.' '8 2
In the Texas case, Clarke v. State, 83 an attorney advised his client to
dispose of the murder weapon. The Texas statute provided that one who
knows that an offense has been committed and conceals the offender or
aids him in avoiding arrest or trial becomes an accessory. An exception
provided that a person who aids an offender in making or preparing his
defense is not an accessory. The court found that advising the client to dis-
pose of the weapon could not constitute aid in making or preparing a de-
fense, but that it did constitute conduct that enabled the perpetrator of the
crime to avoid arrest or trial. 84
D. Receiving Stolen Property
When the client has committed robbery, burglary, theft, extortion, or a
similar crime, defense counsel must be careful not to commit the crime of
receiving stolen property when dealing with the fruits of the crime. Any
179. CAL. PENAL CODE §32 provides:
Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape
from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal
has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted
thereof, is an accessory to such felony.
Id See also Exparte Goldman, 88 P. 819 (Cal. 1906) (defendant indicted for being an acces-
sory to the concealment of stolen property).
180. 381 F.2d 713 (4thCir. 1967); see Serving Two Masters, supra note 1, at 145 (for a
detailed discussion of the facts of this case based on the trial transcript). In State Ex. Rel
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n. v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774,777 (Okla. 1983) the Oklahoma Supreme
Court stated that the attorney who had concealed a weapon used by his client in the com-
mission of a crime, "embraced the role of an accessory to a crime ......
Under Federal law, "whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been
committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent




184. Id at 347.
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person who receives property that has been stolen or obtained in any man-
ner constituting theft or extortion with the knowledge that the property
was stolen, or anyone who conceals, withholds, or aids in concealing or
withholding the property from the owner knowing that it has been stolen
or obtained by extortion, is guilty of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty. 18 Possession of stolen property is not established by mere access or
proximity to the stolen goods; dominion and control must be shown.
186
To establish concealment, all that need be shown is that the whereabouts
of the property was concealed from the rightful owner.
187
E. Tampering
When an attorney or investigator examines and leaves evidence where
it was found, he must be careful not to commit the crime of tampering with
evidence. The California Supreme Court in Meredith inferred that an at-
torney or his investigator may examine the evidence.'88 Penal Code sec-
185. CAL. PENAL CODE §496(1) provides in part:
Every person who buys or receives any property which has been stolen or which has
been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property
to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to
be so stolen or obtained, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a
county jail for not more than one year. ..
Id. The elements of receiving stolen property are: (1) property was received, concealed or
withheld by the accused; (2) the property had been obtained by theft or extortion; and (3)
the accused knew that the property had been so obtained. People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal. 3d 245,
249 507 P.2d 1392, 1395, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (1960). In In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 369,
the Federal District Court concluded that Ryder by taking possession of the bank robbery
proceeds had violated the Virginia larceny statute, which was very similar to the California
receipt of stolen property statute. Virginia Code Section 18.1-107 (1950) (repealed by Acts
1960, c. 358) provided:
If any person buy or receive from another person, or aid in concealing, any stolen
goods or other thing, knowing the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed
guilty of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, although the principal of-
fender be not convicted.
It is also a federal crime to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any
property or money or thing of value knowing to have been taken from a bank or a savings
and loan association. 18 U.S.C. §2113(c). In People v. Wurbs, 347 N.E.2d 879 (11. 1976) the
attorney was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft for arranging return of stolen prop-
erty for a percentage of the reward collected. The court stated: "Defendant's status as an
attorney cannot give him the right to do acts which would becriminal if performed by a lay-
man." Id. at 883.
186. Peoplev. Myles, 50 Cal. App. 3d 423, 429, 123 Cal. Rptr. 348,351 (1975).
187. Williams v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 330, 346, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311, 320
(1978).
188. "We must recognize, however, that in some cases an examination of evidence
may reveal information critical to the defense...." Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 693 n.7, 631 P.2d
at 53 n.7, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619 n.7. Examine means: "1. To inspect closely; to test the condi-
tion of; to inquire carefully." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 (4th ed.
1974). One source states:
Exercise care in picking up objects at a crime scene. Do not pick up objects with a
handkerchief, since prints or microsopic particles adhering to it can inadvertently
be removed. Rather, use the thumb and middle finger to pick up the object by apor-
tion least likely to retain prints. For example, the grips of a revolver with a corru-
gated surface from which no prints can be obtained. Otherwise, a pencil can be
inserted through the trigger guard.
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tion 135 does not specify altering or tampering with evidence as criminal
conduct.'89 Under the Model Penal Code, however, a person is guilty of
tampering with evidence when"... believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, [the person] ... alters,
destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with pur-
pose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation
"190
F. Miscellaneous Crimes
While most California attorneys probably are aware of the crimes of de-
struction or concealment of evidence, conspiracy to obstruct justice, ac-
cessory to the felony, and receipt of stolen property, they may not be
aware of lesser known crimes. 19 1
1. Compounding
If a California attorney as part of his fee arrangement agreed to with-
hold any evidence of the crime in his possession that under Meredith
should be turned over to law enforcement officials, the attorney might be
F.L. BAILEY AND H.B. ROTHBLATr, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL
CASES: FEDERAL AND STATE §392, at 336 (1970). Another authority states: "Evidence
must be packaged so as to avoid breakage, loss, or contamination in transit. Tweezers, for-
ceps, and similar tools are used to collect and place traces and small items in their contain-
ers. Rubber gloves are suggested for handling some physical evidence." P. WESTON AND K.
WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BASIC PERSPECTIVE 90 (2nd ed. 1974) (also discussing
how to handle particular types of evidence).
189. CAL. PENAL CODE §135. With respect to the term "tamper" in California Vehi-
cle Code section 10852, which makes it a crime to break or remove vehicle parts, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated that an accepted definition of tamper is "to interfere with."
Peoplev. Anderson, 15 Cal. 3d 806, 810,543 P.2d 603,606, 126 Cal. Rptr. 235,238 (1975).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE §241.7(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see State v.
Fisher, 103 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Neb. 1960) (defense attorney suspended for one year for ob-
structing justice because during trial recess he forced wooden dowel through bullet hole in
murder victim's belt in order to enlarge it; whether .22 caliber bullet passed through the
hole was crucial to the prosecution's case); see People v. Nicholas, 417 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496
(Sup. Ct., 1979) (holding that helping to remove the victim's body from the scene of the
murder and driving away with the body propped up between two individuals constitutes
tampering with physical evidence).
191. There are numerous other crimes that apply to implicating evidence situations.
Possession of a sawed-off shotgun is a violation of the Federal illegal possession of sawed-
off shotgun statute. 26 U.S.C. §5861. California has a similar statute, which provides that
any person who possesses any instrument or weapon such as a sawed-off shotgun is guilty
of a felony. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020. When the two upstate New York attorneys failed to
report the existence of two human bodies, one of them was prosecuted for violation of two
obscure New York public health statutes dealing with reporting a death without medical
attendance and burial of human remains. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798, 865 (1976);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§4200(1), 4143. California has a statute, which provides that
with the exception of cremated remains "every person who deposits or disposes of any
human remains, in any place within the corporate limits of any city, or city and county, ex-
cept in a cemetery, is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7054. It is
also illegal in California to possess certain controlled substances. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11377.
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guilty of compounding. When a person accepts something of value under
an unlawful agreement to conceal or withhold evidence of the crime, he is
guilty in California of compounding the original crime. The elements of
compounding are: (1) knowledge of the commission of the original crime;
(2) an agreement not to report or prosecute that crime or to withhold any
evidence of it; and (3) the receipt of consideration.19 Compounding de-
pends on an agreement not to act or give evidence. In contrast, being an
accessory to a crime requires concealment, destruction, or tampering with
evidence, which is affirmative conduct.'93
2. Withholding Information
If a California attorney persuades a third party to withhold information
about a crime from the police, he commits a crime. It is a misdemeanor to
knowingly induce another person "to withhold true material information
pertaining to a crime from.., a law enforcement official."' 94 The statute
apparently does not apply to physical evidence or "other things," which
fall within the ambit of Penal Code section 135. Generally, information is
defined as: "something told; news; intelligence; word; knowledge ac-
quired in any manner; facts; data; learning; lore. ,,195 Furthermore,
this statute by its own terms is expressly not applicable "to any attorney
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 provides:
Every person who, having knowledge of the actual commission of a crime, takes
money or property of another, or any gratuity or reward, or any engagement, or
promise thereof, upon any agreement or understanding to compound or conceal
such crime, or to abstain from any prosecution thereof, or to withhold any evidence
thereof, except in the cases provided for by law, in which crimes may be compro-
mised by leave of court, is punishable....
kd In People v. Pic'l, 31 Cal. 3d 731,743-45, 646 P.2d 847, 853-55, 183 Cal. Rptr. 685,692-
93 (1982), the California Supreme Court held that an attorney who prepared a nonprosecu-
tion agreement for execution by a crime victim was guilty of compounding because the at-
torney received the promise of a fee and also cash from the victim. The court reasoned that
the attorney fitted within the statutory language of "every person" who takes money or
other "reward .... or promise thereof.., upon any agreement or understanding to com-
pound" a crime. Id In In re Friedland, 280 A.2d 183 (1971), attorneys under threat of a ma-
licious prosecution suit negotiated a settlement of their client's loanshark agreement in
return for the dropping of criminal charges. The court held that the lawyers acted unethi-
cally in thwarting the criminal process.
Compounding can be distinguished from common law misprision in that an agreement is
required in compounding, but not in misprision. Also misprision, unlike compounding,
does not require a consideration as an element. Lipson, Compounding Crimes: Timefor En-
forcement, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 181-82 (1975).
193. Lipson, supra note 192, at 179.
194. CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(c) provides:
Every person who knowingly induces another person to give false testimony or
withhhold true testimony not privileged by law or to give false material informa-
tion pertaining to a crime to, or to withhold true material information pertaining to
a crime from, a law enforcement official is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id Law enforcement officials include deputy sheriffs, policemen, California highway pa-
trolmen, parole, probation, and other officers designated in Chapter 4.5 of Title 3 of Part 2
of the Penal Code commencing with Section 830. CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(e).
195. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 1160(1971).
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advising a client."' 6 An attorney, however, should advise third parties to
answer questions about evidence asked by law enforcement officials as
long as they can do so without incriminating themselves.
3. Deceit or Collusion
If a California attorney commits "any deceit or collusion, or consents to
any deceit or collusion with intent to deceive the court or any party," he is
guilty of a misdemeanor. 97 Deceit can be "negative as well as affirmative;
it may consist in suppression of that which it is one's duty to declare, as in
the declaration of that which is false."'198 Collusion has been defined as a
"secret combination, conspiracy, or concert of action between two or
more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose."' 199
VI. ETHICAL DUTIES
While walking the professional tightrope between avoiding personal
criminal conduct and protecting the accused's constitutional rights, de-
fense counsel has conflicting ethical duties in dealing with implicating evi-
dence. On the one hand, the attorney has ethical duties to obey the law, to
employ only measures consistent with truth, and to avoid suppressing evi-
dence. Oh the other hand, the attorney has the ethical duties of preserving
his client's confidences and secrets, and representing his client zealously
and competently. When the client persists in conduct such as concealing
evidence, which may involve the attorney in unethical behavior, the attor-
ney may have an ethical duty to withdraw from representation of the cli-
196. CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(0.
197. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6128(a). The California Supreme Court has found
violations of this statute in several disciplinary cases: (1) Sullins v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 609,
622,542 P.2d 531,639, 125 Cal. Rptr. 471,479 (1975) (failure to disclose in petition for ap-
proval of contingency fee in will contest that beneficiary of will had wanted property to go
to will contestant); (2) Snyder v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 3d 289, 555 P.2d 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr.
864, 867 (1976) (filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions containing false allegations and
obtaining an exparte order while knowingly failing to disclose its intended use); (3) Jack-
son v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 509, 591 P.2d 47, 153 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26 (1979) (filing false ac-
countings with probate court with intent to deceive). In Price v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 537,
543-48, 638 P.2d 1311, 1314-17, 179 Cal. Rptr. 914, 917-19 (1982), a murder prosecution,
defense counsel made at least two pretrial requests for discovery of all pertinent evidence
from the prosecution. Deputy District Attorney Price assured defense counsel that all the
requested information had been furnished. During cross-examination of a cab driver, who
was a prosecution witness, defense counsel discovered that the witness had prepared a "trip
ticket" for his fares around the time of the murder. This ticket had not been produced pur-
suant to the request for discovery. The deputy district attorney altered his copy of the ticket
and provided defense counsel with a copy of the altered copy. His motive was to mislead de-
fense counsel, and prevent use of the original ticket or an unaltered original to impeach the
cab driver. The supreme court held that the Deputy District Attorney had violated Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code section 6128(a).
198. MacDonald v. DeFrenery, 168 Cal. 189, 203, 142 P. 73,79 (1914).
199. Hone v. Climatrol Industries, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 3d 513,522 n.4, 130 Cal. Rptr.
770,774 n.4 (1976).
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ent.
A. Obedience of Law
First and foremost, an attorney must obey the law. A philosophy exists
that "lawyers must operate within the bounds of the law and not without
it, and therefore, if there are statutes pertaining to the suppression of evi-
dence, the lawyer must comply with these statutes... ."2 In the case of In
re Ryder,2 ' the federal district court found that Attorney Ryder took pos-
session of a sawed-off shotgun knowing the gun had been used in a rob-
bery and took possession of money knowing that it had been stolen. The
court further found that Ryder intended to break the chain of evidence
that linked the contraband to his client and that he intended to prevent the
use of the contraband in prosecuting his client. The court emphasized that
the attorney, not the client, took the initiative in transferring possession of
the contraband. By illegally possessing the shotgun and committing lar-
ceny, the court concluded that Ryder violated former American Bar Asso-
ciation Canon 15, which required a lawyer to perform within the
boundaries of the law and not violate any law,2" 2 and Canon 32, which
prohibited deception and disloyalty to the law.2"3 Ryder, consequently,
200. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances Informal Op. 1057 (1968).
California Business and Professions Code section 6068(a) provides that it is the duty of a
California attorney to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of Cali-
fornia. The State Bar Act in Business and Professions Code Sections 6000 et. seq. governs
the conduct of California attorneys.
201. 263 F. Supp. 360,361-62,367 (E.D. Va. 1967), affd, 381 F.2d 713,715(4th Cir.
1968); see Serving Two Masters, supra note 1, at 147-49.
202. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 15 provided:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public es-
teem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does
the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transac-
tions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in
winning his client's cause....
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. No fear ofjudicial disfavor or public unpopularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or de-
fense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to
be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney
does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or
any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client.
Id.
203. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 32 provided:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or politi-
cal, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any
service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disre-
spect of thejudicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any per-
son or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of
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was suspended for eighteen months.2°4
B. Suppression of Evidence
As part of this duty of obedience to the law, a California attorney must
not ".... [s]uppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation
to reveal or produce."2"5 The American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility has a similar provision.0 6 Arguably, this legal obli-
gation to reveal or produce evidence arises when a subpoena duces tecum
or formal court order to produce evidence has been issued and served.0 7
Only one court, apparently, has cited the American Bar Association disci-
plinary rule in connection with suppression of evidence. In State v. Staple-
ton,208 two deputy public defenders took possession of a board that their
client claimed he had used to defend himself. Initially, the attorneys re-
fused both the prosecutor's demand to turn over the evidence and his offer
forjoint laboratory testing of the board. Finally, the attorneys turned the
board over to the police after an alleged threat of forcible entry into their
office and a criminal prosecution of them. The Missouri Court of Appeal
the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites
and merits stem and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor
of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives
advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance
with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client
to observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and in-
terpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its va-
lidity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.
But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidel-
ity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal
citizen.
Id.
204. 263 F. Supp. at 369-70. Mitigating factors which resulted in an eighteen-month
suspension, rather than disbarment, were Ryder's consultations with attorneys and ajudge
about his course of conduct and his intent to return the money to the bank after the trial.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the opinion of the district court. 381 F.2d at
715.
205. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 7-107(a). The Rules of Professional Conduct became ef-
fective January 1, 1975. The rules, as amended, are adopted by the Board of Governors of
the State Bar pursuant to the provisions of the State Bar Act, and become effective on ap-
proval by the California Supreme Court. Upon supreme court approval, the rules are bind-
ing on all members of the California State Bar. Any wilful breach of the rules is punishable
as provided by law. "Nothing in these rules is intended to limit or supersede any provsion of
law relating to the duties and obligations of attorneys or the consequences of a violation
thereof. The prohibition of certain conduct in these rules is not to be interpreted as an ap-
proval of conduct not specifically mentioned." Id. 1-100.
206. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) provides: "A
lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or
produce." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27 provides: "Because
it interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evi-
dence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce .... See also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(a)(c).
207. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 371-72 (1979); In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d at 729.
208. 539 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1976).
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stated:
The restraints on a Missouri lawyer are ethical only. The Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-109 requires without fur-
ther definition that: "A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence
that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or pro-
duce."209
C. Confidentiality
Under the California attorney's oath, an attorney swears to "... main-
tain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the
secrets, of his client."210 The term "confidence" refers to information that
is privileged under the attorney-client privilege. The term "secret" refers
"to other information gained in the professional relationship that the cli-
ent has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."2"1 Unlike
the attorney-client privilege, the ethical duty "exists without regard to the
nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowl-
edge." ' 2 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which is asserted only when
the attorney or client is asked in a judicial, administrative, or legislative
proceeding about a confidential communication, the attorney at all times
owes an ethical duty of confidentiality to his client.21 3 This duty continues
even after the termination of the employment relationship.214
Although the California Business & Professions Code and the Rules of
Professional Conduct do not contain any specific exceptions to the ethical
duty of confidentiality, the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Responsibility exceptions are instructive. These exceptions
are permissive, rather than mandatory.215 First, the confidential informa-
tion may be revealed with the consent of the client after the attorney has
209. I'7at658n.1.
210. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §6068(e); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(2) which provides that a lawyer shall not use "a confidence
or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client." See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 1.6.
211. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A). The Alaska
Supreme Court in Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d at 1211 n.19, stated that the deputy public de-
fender followed the advice of the Alaska Bar Association as it affected his obligation to pre-
serve his client's secrets. Apparently, the court believed that the deputy public defender
could ethically deliver the kidnap plan to the prosecutor because he could reasonably con-
clude that he was required to do so by the Alaska destruction and concealment of evidence
statute.
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fully explained the implications of disclosure.21 6 For example, an attorney
must obtain the client's consent before consulting other attorneys about
an ethical problem, if the consultation will involve disclosure of confiden-
tial information.1 7 Second, an attorney may reveal the client's confi-
dences or secrets when permitted under a disciplinary rule or when
disclosure is required by law or court order.218 As previously discussed,
one court and one commentator believe that this rule, when read in con-
junction with Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3), which prohibits a lawyer
from concealing or knowingly failing "to disclose that which he is re-
quired by law to reveal," requires an attorney to turn over implicating evi-
dence to the court.1 9 Third, the attorney may reveal the intention of his
client to commit a crime, such as the destruction of evidence, and may also
reveal any information necessary to prevent the crime. 220 Fourth, the at-
torney may reveal a client's confidences or secrets to defend himself
against an accusation of wrongful conduct such as a malpractice action
brought by the client or a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding
based on ineffective assistance of counsel3 2'
Observation of evidence as a result of a confidential communication
from a client to an attorney is also protected by the attorney's ethical duty
216. Id. DR 4-101(C)(1); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6
which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client un-
less the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in para-
graph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client.
Id.
217. Thus, attorneys with implicating evidence and other ethical problems have
submitted hypothetical questions to judges, other attorneys, research services, and ethics
committees. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 362-64. In Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1206, deputy
public defender Cline submitted a hypothetical question to the ethics committee of the
Alaska Bar Association. He posited a bank robbery in which the safe was blown open with
plastic explosives, and the subsequent discovery by his client's friend in the client's vehicle
of a detailed plan of the bank, a list of "things to take with me," and a receipt for purchase of
plastic explosives. The attorney also noted that the vehicle might be repossessed soon. D.
LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES & MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 608-09 (4th Ed.
1981).
218. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2).
219. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 173-78 (1979). Seesupra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
220. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR4-101(C)(3); see Sevilla,
Between Scylla and Charybdis: The EthicalPerils of the CriminalDefense Lawyer, 2 J. CRIM.
DEF. 237,263-65 (1976); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1).
221. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6(b)(2).
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of confidentiality. In People v. Belge,222 two upstate New York attorneys
observed the locations of two bodies described to them by their client. The
New York court and the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York State Bar Association found that the lawyers acted properly in not
disclosing the locations to the authorities.223
The location of stolen property may also be protected when confiden-
tially disclosed by a client to his attorney. When the defendant in a larceny
prosecution told counsel the whereabouts of the stolen property, the New
York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, interpret-
ing Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(2),224 concluded that the lawyer should
not reveal the location of the stolen property to law enforcement officials.
The Committee reasoned that an attorney "has no affirmative obligation
to reveal to the authorities the location of stolen property" because the
ethical rule pertaining to disclosure of confidences and secrets when re-
quired by law or court order is permissive, rather than mandatory. The
Committee further concluded that revealing the location of the stolen
property to law enforcement authorities would be improper without the
consent of the client because this action would risk exposing the client as
the possessor of the property. The Committee noted that concealment by
a thief is "normally incident" to commission of larceny and "this reality"
permits the inference that the possessor stole the property. If the attorney
revealed the location of the stolen property, the Committee reasoned that:
"... he would, in effect, be assuming a role adverse to the inter-
ests of his client and repugnant to the confidential relationship
between lawyer and client. In essence, he would be disclosing
confidential information as to the crime of larceny that is
charged against his client. In other words, he would be doing in-
directly what he could not do directly as a matter of law, as well
as ethical obligation.'
222. 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga, County Ct.), affd mem., 376 N.Y.S.2d 771
(1975), affdpercuriam, 41 N.Y.2d 60,359 N.E.2d 377,390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
223. Id. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 479 (1978), 50 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 259 (1978).
224. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) provides:
"A lawyer may reveal: ... [c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules
or required by law or court order." Id.
225. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 405 (1975); 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 526
(1975); cf. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 530 (1981) (holding that a lawyer
may not retain a piece of documentary evidence that his client's friend surreptitiously re-
moved from a police station); see also N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 466
(1977), 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 351 (1977) (holding that a lawyer may not accept proceeds of a
crime from client for safekeeping, but should not reveal the client's proposal). Okla. Bar
Ass'n. Legal Ethics Comm. Advisory Op. 110 (1936) holds that a member of the bar who
induces his client to reveal the hiding place of stolen jewels under the pretense of applying
them on his fee but in reality to enable their recovery by law enforcement officials in order
to return them to the rightful owner is guilty of unprofessional conduct (available from the
Oklahoma Bar Association, P.O. Box 53036, Oklahoma City, Okla. 73152).
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D. Competence
A California attorney also has an ethical duty of competence. He must
apply sufficient learning, skill, and diligence necessary to fulfill his duties
arising from his representation of the client. 6 The attorney must perform
whatever research lawyers representing clients in similar matters would
perform to make informed and intelligent judgments.227 Competently
representing a criminal defendant includes careful investigation of all the
factual and legal bases for defenses that may be available to the client. 8
E. Withdrawal
Defense counsel may be required to withdraw from representation of
the accused because of difficulties connected with implicating evidence. If
a California attorney in a contemplated or pending criminal prosecution
"learns or it is obvious" that he may be called to testify other than on be-
half of his client, for example, about the location or condition of evidence
that has been removed or altered, the attorney may continue the represen-
tation only "until it is apparent that his testmony is or may be prejudicial
to his client." 9
Depending on the client's conduct, counsel may have to withdraw to
avoid prosecution for a criminal or disciplinary violation. When an attor-
ney considers moving to withdraw because he discovers that evidence has
been destroyed, tampered with, or concealed, the attorney will confront
several difficult problems. The attorney may not be certain who sup-
pressed the evidence; he may have difficulty in finding a legal basis for
withdrawal; or he may be faced with the problems of revealing confiden-
tial information and violating the client's constitutional rights.
When the evidence has been destroyed, tampered with, or concealed,
determining the culpable individual or individuals may be difficult. The
client may deny responsibility. A friend or relative of the client may have
suppressed the evidence. The attorney must not move to withdraw based
only on a belief that his client or client's friend or relative has destroyed,
concealed, or tampered with the evidence. Unless the client or witness ad-
226. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct6-101(A)(1); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A) (which defines incompetence to include handling a legal
matter without adequate preparation) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.1,1.3).
227. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 359,530 P.2d 589,595, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,627(1980).
228. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 422,425,590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739
(1979).
229. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-11 l(A)(5); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR5-102(B).
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mits the act, the attorney must confirm his belief with an independent in-
vestigation.230
None of the mandatory grounds for withdrawal under California Rule
of Professional Conduct 2-11 1(B) seem applicable to destruction, con-
cealment, or tampering with evidence by a client. Although one
mandatory ground is the attorney's knowledge that his continued em-
ployment by the client will result in a violation of the State Bar Act or the
Rules of Professional Conduct,23' the attorney would not violate Rule of
Professional Conduct 7-107(a), which prohibits a California attorney
from supressing "any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to
reveal or produce," even if he continued the representation after the sup-
pression of evidence occurred. The act of destruction or concealment
would already have been committed by the client, not the attorney, and
therefore the attorney's continued employment would not result in a dis-
ciplinary violation. Furthermore, this rule arguably applies only to evi-
dence that is subject to a subpoena duces tecum or an order to produce.
The attorney's continued employment also would not violate the provi-
sions of the State Bar Act dealing with support of the law, respect to the
courts, and employment of means consistent with truth because the attor-
ney would be faced with afait accompli. 32
Although the mandatory grounds for an attorney's withdrawal do not
seem applicable to destruction or concealment of evidence by a client,
various permissive withdrawal grounds may apply. When the client con-
ceals evidence in violation of Penal Code section 135, a ground for with-
drawal is that the client "[plersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of
conduct." 3 If the attorney discovers that the client has destroyed or tam-
pered with evidence, the ground that the client's conduct "renders it un-
reasonaby difficult" for the attorney to provide effective representation
might apply because the client might lie in response to prosecution ques-
230. People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981).
231. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-11 l(B)(2); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR2-1 10(B)(2) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.16(a)(1). An attorney may not be permitted to withdraw unless he can avoid prejudicing
the client's rights. The attorney must provide "due notice" to the client of his intent to with-
draw, allow the client enough time to employ other counsel, and deliver to the client the
case file and any other items to which he is entitled. Also, the attorney must comply with
substantive and procedural law and court rules, including obtaining court permission for
withdrawal from the case if he is the attorney of record. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-
11 l(A)(2). Finally, he must "refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not
been earned." Id 2-11 l(A)(3); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR2-110(A)(l)(2)(3); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.16(d).
232. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §6068(a), (b), (d).
233. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-11 1(C)(1)(b); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR2-1 10(CX1)(b); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT1.16(b)(1)(2).
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tions about what happened to the evidence.234 When an accused has de-
stroyed, tampered with, or concealed evidence, other "good cause" for
withdrawal might exist because the client refuses to cooperate or follow
the attorney's advice concerning implicating evidence.2 35
When the attorney of record for the accused has determined that his cli-
ent has destroyed, concealed, or tampered with evidence and that a legal
basis for withdrawal exists, he is confronted with the duty to preserve his
client's confidences and secrets. An attorney of record must obtain court
approval before he can withdraw, and the court may watnt to know the fac-
tual as well as the legal basis for his motion. When the attorney discovers
that his client has destroyed or tampered with evidence, the crime has
been committed and cannot be undone. The general rule is that informa-
tion about a past crime divulged to an attorney by the client to obtain legal
advice is protected by the attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality and
the attorney-client privilege.236 If the attorney obtained the information
about the destruction or concealment of the evidence during the profes-
sional relationship, such as from a third party, and disclosure of this infor-
mation would be detrimental to the client, the information is protected as
a secret.237 The client's destruction of, or tampering with, evidence does
not fit into the future crime exception to the attorney-client privilege or
the duty of confidentiality if the client did not consult the attorney about
committing the criminal act.238
When the client is concealing evidence, he is committing a continuing
crime; the criminal conduct can be terminated by returning the evidence
to the place where it was found or where it is normally kept. If the attorney
persuaded the client to return the evidence to its last or normal keeping
place, the attorney no longer could allege grounds for withdrawal based
on the client's pursuit of an illegal course of conduct, the presence of un-
234. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-11 l(C)(1)(d); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR2-1 1O(C)(1)(d). Wisc. Bar Ass'n. Ethics Op. 11/77 states:
An attorney who is aware that an object of her/his client's was found at the scene of
alleged criminal misconduct is not under an ethical obligation to disclose the exis-
tence of the object or where it was found to the authorities. S/he should discuss the
matter with her/his client and it is the client's decision whether to disclose the in-
formation. The attorney must, however, tell the client s/he cannot lie about the
item and s/he must tell the truth about it if questioned concerning it.
Supplement to the June 1979 issue of Wisc. Bar Bul. 94.
235. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-11 1(C)(6); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-111(C)(6); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.16(b)(6).
236. See ABA Comm. Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (1953); Olwell, 394 P.2d
at 684. If the attorney is not of record, the attorney can withdraw without court approval
and without revealing any confidential information, as long as he avoids any prejudice to
the client.
237. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §6068(e); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON.
SIBILrIY DR 4-101(A).
238. CAL. EVID. CODE §956; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR4-101(C)(3).
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reasonably difficult circumstances under which to carry out the represen-
tation, or "other good cause" for withdrawal. Should the attorney be
unsuccessful in persuading the client to return the evidence, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, ethics opinions, and cases unfortunately provide
little guidance for attorneys representing clients who are committing con-
tinuing crimes. 239
The Colorado Supreme Court has taken the position that courts should
not require criminal defense counsel to divulge a confidential communi-
cation in support of a motion to withdraw.2' In a case in which counsel
sought to withdraw because his client wanted him to present witnesses
who would perjure themselves, the court expressly held that defense coun-
sel should not tell the judge the specific reasons for the motion to with-
draw.24' Instead, the court recommended counsel advise the court that he
and his client have an "irreconcilable conflict." This might mean a con-
flict of interest, a personality conflict, or a conflict as to trial strategy or
presentation of false evidence. The court recommended that counsel
make a private record of the circumstances, his advice and reasons for that
advice, and his conclusion, because a disagreement between counsel and
client about trial tactics might be the subject of a post conviction proceed-
ing on the issue of effectiveness of counsel.24 2
The Colorado Supreme Court was less clear about whether the trial
239. Callan & David, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Dis-
closure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 362-65
(1976); see also N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. No. 405 (1975); LA County
BarAssociation Comm. on LegalEthics Op. No. 267 (1960) in 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 103 (1963).
Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not con-
stitute aiding and abbeting. Pinell v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App. 2d 284,287-88,42 Cal.
Rptr. 676,678-79. (1965)
240. People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 13 (Colo. 1981). "The court may wish an expla-
nation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts
that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional con-
siderations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as suf-
ficient." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.16, Comment at 17.
The Commission on Professional Responsibility in the American Lawyer's Code of Con-
duct (Public Discussion Draft 1980), 605 in illustrative case 6(a) states:
A lawyer representing the accused in a criminal case learns from the client he in-
tends to present a false alibi. The lawyer knows that he will be required to give an
explanation to the judge if he makes a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel; he
also knows that the judge will take an equivocal explanation as an indication that
the client intends to commit peijury. The lawyer nevertheless asks leave to with-
draw, telling the judge only, 'I have an ethical problem, my client and I do not see
eye to eye.' The lawyer has committed a disciplinary violation.
Id. In Chaleff v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 721,722-24, 138 Cal. Rptr. 735, 736-37
(1977), a public defender declined to accept a court appointment as an advisory counsel be-
cause he would be placed in an "untenable ethical position." He stated that he was "hand-
cuffed" in explaining his position to the court because of the attorney-client privilege. The
Appellate Court reversed a contempt conviction. In Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844,
(1980), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: "The protection of a client's con-
fidence is so basic a tenet of professional responsibility that it yields only in the rarest of real
ethical dilemmas. Thus in such a dilemma, advice, disassociation, and even passive repre-
sentation, may be resorted to in lieu of exposure." Id. at 849.
241. 638 P.2d at 14.
242. Id.
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court should allow withdrawal based on counsel's conclusory statement
of "irreconcilable conflict." The court stated that the decision was within
judicial discretion. The court indicated, however, that the trial judge
would bejustified in denying the motion unless a reasonable basis existed
for believing the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated so badly
that the attorney could not render effective assistance of counsel.243 The
court was Iarticularly concerned about not allowing defendants to post-
pone their trials indefinitely by telling each of their successor counsel that
they intended to lie, thereby causing "a perpetual cycle of eleventh-hour
motions to withdraw." 244
Allowing withdrawal by an attorney after his client destroys, conceals,
or tampers with evidence may often be unjustified in terms of the cost to
the administration ofjustice. The damage to the truth-seeking function of
the judicial system is completed if the client has destroyed or tampered
with the evidence and also if a change of attorneys will not convince an ac-
cused to stop concealing evidence. Although the attorney may want to
withdraw to avoid being disciplined or prosecuted, the administration of
justice is not advanced by having successor counsel appointed for the sole
reason that the destruction or tampering occurred during representation
by another attorney. When successor counsel is appointed for an accused
entitled to a public defender, an additional public expense may be in-
curred for successor counsel to repeat some of the trial preparation ac-
complished by the predecessor counsel. If the attorney moves to withdraw
without specifying the basis for his action, and the motion is denied, he
should satisfy his ethical duty and avoid criminal complicity.
An ethics opinion of the Los Angeles County Bar Association is in-
structive for California attorneys who must decide whether client confi-
dences should be revealed in support of a motion to withdraw. The client
of the attorney requesting the opinion had been convicted of hit and run
driving after lying that he was the driver to protect a youthful family mem-
ber who was the actual driver. The Committee concluded that representa-
tion of the client at the time of sentencing after having learned of his
perjury would be improper. If the client would not voluntarily disclose his
perjury, the Committee stated that the attorney should move to withdraw
without disclosing his client's confidences or secrets. 245
Counsel not only discloses client confidences if he reveals the factual
basis for his motion to withdraw, but he also may deprive the client of a
243. Id. at 15.
244. Id. at 14.
245. L.A. Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 305 (1968); 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 254-57
(1970).
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constitutional right.2' Revealing that the client destroyed or concealed
evidence after the client advised counsel of his action would constitute a
link in the chain of evidence to the client for a Penal Code section 135 pros-
ecution and consequently, would deprive the client of his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. A Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, however, held that a defendant is not denied effective assistance
of counsel when the attorney tells thejudge his reasons in support of a mo-
tion to withdraw, if the jury is the fact finder and assesses the punish-
ment.247 The District of Columbia Circuit has held that thejudge must be
advised of facts underlying the motion to withdraw because the basic con-
stitutional right of effective assistance of counsel is involved.2' The same
Circuit, however, concluded that a defendant was denied due process in
violation of the fifth amendment when counsel advised the motions judge
of his client's intent to commit perjury and then permitted his client to go
to a bench trial before the samejudge.249
F. A.B.A. Proposed Standard
The American Bar Association Committee on Ethical Considerations
in Criminal Cases, Criminal Justice Section, in June 1981 proposed an
Ethical Standard to Guide Lawyer Who Receives Physical Evidence Im-
plicating His Client in Criminal Conduct.2 0 The proposed standard ap-
246. In the case of Loweryv. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, (9th Cir. 1978), defense counsel
made a motion to withdraw without stating the reason. After denial of the motion, the at-
torney ceased direct examination of the client and did not mention the client's perjurious
testimony in closing argument. This omission alerted the judge, who was the trier of fact,
that the client had committed perjury. The court consequently held that the attorney had
deprived the client of his due process right to a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment.
Id at 730. In Justice Hufstedler's concurring opinion, she stated that defense counsel's "ac-
tions were so adverse to petitioner's interests as to deprive her of effective assistance of
counsel." Id at 732.
247. Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275,284 (Tex. Crin. App. (1981)).
248. Thornton v. United States 357 A.2d 429,435-36 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1976).
249. Butlerv. United States, 414A.2d 844,853 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1980).
250. 29 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2465-67 [hereinafter cited as "Standard"].(a) A lawyer who receives a physical item under circumstances implicating a client
in criminal conduct shall disclose the location of or shall deliver that item to law en-
forcement authorities only: (1) if such is required by law or court order, or (2) as
provided in paragraph (d).(b) Unless required to disclose, the lawyer shall return the item to the source from
whom the lawyer receives it, except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d). In re-
turning the item to the source, the lawyer shall advise the source of the legal conse-
quences pertaining to possession or destruction of the item.(c) A lawyer may receive or retain the item for a period of time during which the
lawyer: (1) intends to return it to the owner; (2) reasonably fears that return of the
item to the source will result in destruction of the item; (3) reasonably fears that re-
turn of the item to the source will result in physical harm to anyone; (4) intends to
test, examine, inspect or use the item in any way as part of the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client; or (5) cannot return it to the source. If the lawyer retains the item,
the lawyer shall do so in a manner that does not impede the lawful ability of law en-
forcement to obtain the item.
(d) If the item received is contraband, or if in the lawyer's judgment the lawyer can-
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plies at any stage of the prosecutorial process to contraband and the
instrumentalities, fruits, and other evidence of a crime. In attempting to
accommodate the criminal defense attorney's conflicting duties of loyalty
to his client and obedience to the law, the Committee considered both the
restitutionary interests of crime victims and the societal interests in a
criminal justice system that within constitutional limits finds the truth
and provides speedy justice. 15' The proposed standard provides guide-
lines to assist criminal defense attorneys in deciding when to accept, re-
turn to the source, or disclose or deliver the evidence to law enforcement
officials.
Unless the attorney is required by law to disclose or turn over to law en-
forcement officials the implicating evidence, the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee concluded that the attorney must refuse to accept it and
return the evidence to the source.2 52 The Committee recognized that the
offices of attorneys should not become depositories for physical evidence
that criminally implicates their clients unless a legitimate reason exists for
the attorney to receive and retain the evidence 53 When the attorney re-
turns the evidence to the client or the third party, the Committee stated
that the attorney must advise the person about the law pertaining to pos-
session or destruction of evidence. 5 4
Under the American Bar Association proposed standard, in certain cir-
not retain the item in a way that does not pose an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to anyone, the lawyer shall disclose the location of or shall deliver the item to
law enforcement authorities.(e) If the lawyer discloses the location of or delivers the items to law enforcement
authorities under paragraphs (a) or (d), or to a third party under paragraph (c) (1),
the lawyer shall do so in the way best designed to protect the client's interests.
Id The proposed "Standard" is still under consideration by the ABA Comm. on Ethical
Considerations in Criminal cases for eventual recommendation to the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice for inclusion in the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice: The Defense Function. The Committee did not have the benefit of the
California Supreme Court decision in Meredith, which was filed July 20, 1981, and conse-
quently its standard does not take into consideration the Meredith "removal rule."
251. Standard, supra note 250, commentary at 1. The commentary is available from
the ABA Criminal Justice Section, 1800 M. Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
252. Id subdivision (b). The American Lawyers Code of Conduct illustrative case
applicable to this situation is as follows:
A lawyer represents a client in a murder case. The client leaves the murder weapon
with the lawyer. The lawyer fails to advise the client that the weapon might be more
accessible to the prosecution in the lawyer's possession then the client's, and that, if
the lawyer retains the weapon, he will produce it, if ordered to do so by a valid sub-
poena. The lawyer has committed a disciplinary violation by failing to fully advise
the client... The lawyer would not commit a disciplinary violation by returning the
weapon to the client, unless the lawyer also encouraged the client to make it un-
available as evidence.
Public Discussion Draft: The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, published by the Ros-
coe Pound American Trial Lawyers Foundation (June, 1980), illustrative case 3(b)(c), at
305, reprinted in 16 TRIAL no. 8 at 54 (Aug. 1980).
253. Standard, supra note 250, commentary at 3.
254. Id subdivision (b). This admonition is required by the attorney's duty to advise
his client, if his client is the source, and also by society's interest in prevention of the unlaw-
ful destruction or concealment of evidence. Id. commentary at 3. ,
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cumstances an attorney is ethically permitted, but not required, to receive
or retain the evidence for a legitimate purpose and for a reasonable period
of time.2 5 The attorney, however, must not impede the use of subpoena or
search warrants by law enforcement authorities to obtain the evidence. 5 6
An attorney may receive and retain the implicating evidence, if he reason-
ably believes the evidence will be destroyed should he return the evidence
to the source, or if the attorney reasonably fears that return of the evidence
will result in physical harm to someone.25 The attorney may also receive
and retain stolen property to return it to the rightful owner.258 Further-
more, he may receive and retain the evidence for a reasonable period of
time to test, examine, inspect, or use the items as part of his preparation of
the defense.259 After the reasonable period of time expires, the attorney
may have an obligation to turn the evidence over to law enforcement au-
thorities.260 Otherwise, the evidence must be returned to the source with
advice about the legal consequences of its destruction or concealment.2 6'
Finally, the attorney may retain the evidence if he cannot return it to the
source.
262
According to the American Bar Association Committee proposal, an
attorney is required to disclose the location of the evidence or deliver it to
law enforcement when: (1) required to do so by law or court order; (2) the
evidence received is contraband; or (3) retention of the evidence would
"impose an unreasonable risk of physical harm" upon someone.263 When-
ever the attorney discloses the location of the evidence, or delivers it to law
enforcement authorities, or returns the evidence to the source, the Com-
mittee stated that he must do so in a manner that protects the client's in-
terests.2 64 The attorney should consider methods of return or disclosure
255. Id. subdivision (c).
256. Id commentary at 4.
257. Id subdivisions (c)(2), (3). This recognizes society's interest in the preservation
of evidence and prevents implication of the lawyer in criminal conduct. Id commentary at
4.
258. Id. subdivision (c)(1). This fulfills society's interests in restitution of the victim.
Id. commentary at 4.
259. Id subdivision (c)(4).
260. Id commentary at 5; see State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964).
261. Standard, supra note 250, subdivision (b).
262. Id subdivision (c)(5).
263. Id subdivisions (a), (d). A lawyer has a duty to follow the law of thejurisdiction
in so far as in the lawyer'sjudgment this law provides clear instruction. The laws which are
most likely to be applicable include obstruction ofjustice and concealment or destruction
of evidence statutes, and court decisions "which in the lawyer'sjudgement provide clear in-
struction regarding an attorney's duties under various circumstances," such as Ryder, In re
January 1976 Grand Jury, Morrell, and Qiwell. Id commentary at 2. "Since mere possesson
of contraband is thought to be a crime and is always evidence that a crime has been commit-
ted, the lawyer is ethically bound to have contraband returned to appropriate law enforce-
ment authorities." Id commentary at 5.
264. Id. subdivision (e).
If the lawyer has no legal obligation to turn over the physical evidence, then the
duty to preserve the client's secrets is paramount and no ethical obligation to turn
over the evidence exists. If, on the other hand, a legal obligation attaches, then the
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that best protect the client's identity, privileged communications, and
confidences and secrets, as well as the client's privilege against self-in-
crimination. Suggested methods include a return or disclosure that is
anonymous, that reveals only the attorney and not the client, or that
reveals the client but not the relevancy of the item.26
VII. CONCLUSION
The cardinal rule for criminal defense attorneys who must make a deci-
sion about implicating evidence is to avoid taking possession unless test-
ing or analysis of the evidence will most likely result in a decision by the
prosecution either not to file charges or to dismiss the charges, or unless
taking possession will otherwise assist in the defense. If the attorney takes
possession of the evidence, the appellate decisions uniformly state that he
must turn the evidence over to law enforcement officials.266 Although
most appellate courts also state that the prosecution must not reveal the
lawyer is ethically required to obey thelaw. This raises two further problems: first,
the best way to return the evidence, and second, whether the fact that the lawyer is
acting against the interest of the client requires asking for court permission to with-
draw from representation.
If the law provides for a method of returning the evidence, the lawyer must
comply with that method. If it does not.... consistent with the lawyer's duty to re-
veal only such confidences and secrets of the client as are necessary in the circum-
stances .... the lawyer should turn over the evidence in a manner least prejudicial tothe client.
Where the lawyer, after accepting custody of incriminating evidence, becomes
convinced that it must be surrendered .... it is also appropriate for the lawyer to ex-
plain to the client the legal requirements which prevent the lawyer from retaining it.
At the same time, the lawyer should offer to withdraw from the case if the client no
longer feels that continued representation by the lawyer is in the client's best inter-
ests....
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 530 (1981).
265. Standard, supra note 250, commentary at 6. Methods of anonymous return in-
clude registered mail with no return address or a cooperative police officer.
266. Olwell, 394 P.2d at 684-85; Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d at 525-26, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722;
Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1210. "From the foregoing cases emerges the rule that a criminal de-
fense attorney must turn over to the prosecution real evidence that the attorney obtains
from his client." Id. In ReNavarro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 325,330,155 Cal. Rptr. 522,525 (1979).
"The Lee court applied the long-standing rule that an attorney must relinquish incriminat-
ing physical evidence to the police." Id
In People v. Nash, 313 N.W. 2d 307 (Mich. App. 1980), defense counsel informed the police
by letter that he had in his possession a revolver and other evidence. The items were seized
pursuant to a search warrant. The Michigan Supreme Court stated: "We adopt the reason-
ing of the Court in Olwell and hold that defendant's attorney had a duty to relinquish the
evidence to the authorities and that he did not violate the defendant's attorney-client privi-
lege by doing so." Id at 314.
In Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 1038, 1043 n.2 (Alaska 1980), the defendant's attorney
turned over the murder weapon to the state troopers. The attorney's investigator had lo-
cated the weapon using information from the defendant. The Alaska Supreme Court stated
that relinquishment of the gun by the attorney to law enforcement was required under its
holding in Morrell.
In State v. Carlin, 640 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1982), after discussing Olwell, Morrell, Ryder,
Lee, and Meredith, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "Since the appellant's attorney had a
duty to turn over the evidence under the line of cases mentioned above, there was no error in
the court ordering him to do so." Id at 328.
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source of the evidence to the trier of fact, under Meredith267 a danger exists
that the source may be revealed if a stipulation about the location or con-
dition of the evidence cannot be arranged. Possession of the evidence is
usually of little value to the defense other than to secrete it from law en-
forcement authorities, which is criminal and unethical conduct for an at-
torney. Possession by defense counsel of the defendant's knife in Qlwell,
the defendant's bloody shoes in Lee, the kidnap plan in Morrell, and the
victim's wallet in Meredith, for example, were all unnecessary for the
preparation of an effective legal defense. If the prosecution discovers the
evidence, the defense can examine it through criminal discovery proce-
dures. If necessary, a court order can be obtained to permit testing. By re-
fraining from taking possession of evidence, the attorney avoids being-a
repository of criminal material, and by not turning over the evidence to
law enforcement officials, the attorney avoids contributing to the convic-
tion of his client, as well as a potential ineffective assistance of counsel or
malpractice claim.
A competent attorney can avoid many potential constitutional, crimi-
nal, and ethical problems involving implicating evidence by discussing
the evidence in the case with his client, staff, and third parties before evi-
dence is presented to him. After the attorney has established rapport with
the client or when the client reveals the existence of evidence, the attorney
should advise the client that: (1) It is a crime to destroy, conceal, alter or
tamper with evidence;268 (2) Their conversations about the past crime are
confidential, but any conversation about a future crime, such as destruc-
tion or concealment of, or tampering with, evidence is not confidential;269
(3) The client must tell the attorney everything he knows about the alleged
crime, whether helpful or harmful, so that the attorney can develop the
best possible defense and avoid being surprised by the prosecution; (4) If
the client tells the attorney about the location of evidence, and the attor-
ney, his investigator, or authorized agent examines the evidence but does
not destroy, conceal, remove, alter, or tamper with it, the existence and the
location of the evidence are confidential. If the attorney, his investigator,
or agent, however, removes or alters the evidence, the attorney is required
by the California Supreme Court decision in Meredith to turn the evidence
over to law enforcement officials and to disclose by stipulation its location
or previous condition. If the evidence cannot be presented in a way that
will not reveal its source, the attorney or investigator may be required to
testify about its location or condition.27 In that situation, the attorney
267. 29 Cal. 3d at 695, 631 P.2dat54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
268. See supra notes 151-69 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 56,57,61-65 and accompanying text.
Pacific LawJournal / VoL 15
will move to withdraw, and if the motion is granted, a successor counsel
will be appointed; (5) To avoid the difficulty just discussed, the attorney
or his investigator will initially only examine the evidence and perhaps
photograph and take notes about it, but will not remove, alter, or take pos-
session of the evidence. The attorney will then discuss with the client the
results of the on-scene examination of the evidence, and tactical advan-
tages and disadvantages of removing the evidence. The evidence will not
be removed for any purpose other than to prevent a possible destruction
of it or possible harm to someone, unless the attorney and his client agree
that it should be removed for testing or for some other proper purpose in
furtherance of the client's defense. If they disagree on whether the evi-
dence should be removed, the attorney will move to withdraw from the
case. Should law enforcement officials obtain the evidence, defense coun-
sel can also obtain it for examination through criminal discovery proce-
dures;"7' (6) The instrumentality, fruits, or other evidence of a crime are
subject to seizure under a search warrant when they are in the possession
of the attorney, defendant, or any third party,"' and they are subject to
production pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum when in the possession of
the attorney or a third party;273 (7) If the attorney subsequently discovers
that any evidence has been destroyed, concealed, altered, or tampered
with, he will move to withdraw from the case. When he moves to with-
draw, the attorney will advise the court that his continued representation
of the client will result in a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct
without identifying the rule or the factual basis for the motion. A risk ex-
ists, however, that the judge may require the attorney to state the legal or
factual basis that the attorney believes necessitates his withdrawal.
To avoid assisting the prosecution in convicting his client, the defense
attorney should instruct his staff, and especially his investigator and re-
ceptionist, that the attorney will be obligated to turn over to the prosecu-
tion any evidence which they take into their possession. Therefore, the
staff should not accept evidence from a client or third party unless at the
direction of the attorney. A California attorney should also advise his
staff that he will have to disclose to law enforcement officials the location
or condition of any evidence that is removed or altered by the defense
team. If the investigator discovers evidence, he should make a written rec-
ord and if appropriate, take pictures and then contact the attorney for in-
structions. If an examination of the evidence is necessary, the
examination should be done without destroying any fingerprints or other-
wise damaging the evidence. The staff should know that the attorney may
271. Seesupra note 3 and accompanying text.
272. Seesupra notes 36 and 66 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 66-72 and accompanying text.
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be sued for malpractice, discliplined, or accused of ineffective assistance
of counsel if they or the attorney bungle the handling of implicating evi-
dence. In addition, the attorney should advise his staff about the law of
concealment and destruction of evidence, search warrants, and attorney-
client confidentiality.
If a third party, who is not an agent of the client or the attorney, tells the
attorney or his investigator about the existence or location of evidence,
the attorney should inform the third party that the attorney will have his
investigator examine the evidence and report to him, so that the attorney
can decide with the client whether to remove the evidence for testing and
subsequently turn over the evidence to the prosecution, or whether to
leave the evidence in its present location. In addition, the third party
should be advised about the law of destruction and concealment of evi-
dence, the availability to the prosecution of search warrants and subpoe-
nas duces tecum, and the attorney's ethical duty to withdraw.2
74
If the client brings evidence to the attorney, the attorney should not ac-
cept the evidence unless the attorney and the client decide that the likeli-
hood that test results will be beneficial to the defense outweighs the
disadvantages of turning the evidence over to the prosecution. Since the
Meredith exception to the attorney-client privilege refers only to counsel
and not to the defendant,275 the client should be advised that the evidence
should be returned to its last keeping place or to its normal keeping place.
The client also should be told that the fruits, instrumentalities, or other ev-
idence of a crime cannot be subpoenaed from the client because of the
privilege against self-incrimination, but can be subpoenaed from the at-
torney or a third party. In addition, the client should be informed about
the crime of destruction or concealment of evidence, search warrants, the
availability of criminal discovery procedures, and the attorney's ethical
duty to withdraw.
If a third party, who is not an agent of the client or the attorney, brings
the implicating evidence to the attorney, the attorney should not accept
the evidence unless he believes that it might be destroyed or that the evi-
dence might be harmful to others if not taken into his custody. If these two
provisos do not apply, the attorney should advise the third party that he
should return the evidence to where it was found, and that the attorney
will decide with the client whether to take possession of it. In addition, the
274. The Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee advised Cline to return the evi-
dence to the third party from whom he had received it, inform him of the applicable Alaska
statute that was very similar to California Penal Code section 135, and withdraw. 575 P.2d
at 1211. In an informal letter opinion, the chairman of the committee stated that this advicewas given ".... to re-create, as nearly as possible, the status quo ante." D. LOUISELL, J.
KAPLAN & WALTZ, CASES & MATERIALS MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 610 (4th Ed. 1981).
275. 29 Cal. 3d at 695,631 P.2d at 54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
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attorney should inform the third party about the law pertaining to de-
struction or concealment of evidence, the availability of search warrants
and subpoena duces tecums, and the attorney's ethical duty to withdraw.
After the attorney advises the client or the third party to return the evi-
dence to its last or normal keeping place, a risk exists that the client or a
third party will destroy or conceal the evidence, and that the client may re-
tain another attorney and never mention the evidence to the new attorney.
If the client or third party has not already destroyed or concealed the evi-
dence, however, the client or third party may be willing to follow the attor-
ney's advice. The attorney might advise the client that an inference will be
created by a missing item of evidence, which most likely was last in the cli-
ent's possession, that the evidence had been destroyed or concealed by
him, and that this inference might contribute to his conviction. 6 The cli-
ent should also be advised that thejury will be instructed that attempts to
suppress evidence, such as destroying or concealing the evidence, may be
considered as circumstances tending to show a consciousness of guilt.2 77
The attorney might also point out to the client that some types of evidence
may be of such an unexpected nature, so difficult to locate, or so nones-
sential to the prosecution's case that law enforcement officials either may
not bother to look for them, or may not find them if they do look.278 In ad-
dition, the client might not want to risk thejudge's inquiry at a hearing on
a motion to withdraw about the grounds for that motion.
When the attorney advises the client or third party that the physical evi-
dence be returned to the normal or last keeping place, the attorney does
not commit a criminal act. The attorney would not be concealing the evi-
dence; he would not be acting with the knowledge or intent to prevent evi-
dence from being produced in a criminal proceeding. On the contrary, the
attorney would be recommending that the evidence be placed where it
otherwise would be found through law enforcement investigation or pur-
suant to a search warrant. 279 Similarly, the necessary intent is lacking ei-
ther to agree or to conspire to destroy or conceal the evidence.280 The
attorney would not be an accessory after the fact because he would not be
aiding the accused in a nonprofessional manner with the intent that he
avoid conviction. 281 The attorney would not be inducing the third party to
withhold information; he would be advising the client or third party to re-
276. CAL. EVID. CODE §413.
277. CAL JIC2.06.
278. For example, the Morrell kidnap plan, the Clutchette upholstery receipt, or the
Meredith victim's wallet.
279. See supra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
1984 / Incriminating Criminal Evidence
place the evidence so that information would not be missing.282 He would
not be suppressing any information that he had a duty to reveal, nor
would he be conspiring with the client to defeat the presentation of the ev-
idence to the trier of fact.283
When the attorney has the evidence in his possession, he can keep it for
a reasonable period of time to have tests performed for the preparation of
the defense and then must turn the evidence over to law enforcement offi-
cials.284 If the client has not been charged with a crime, the attorney might
turn the evidence over to law enforcement officials without identifying the
client and assert the minority and California attorney-client privilege rule
that the client's identity is privileged.285 If the client has been charged with
a crime, the attorney could turn the evidence over to ajudge and seek a
stipulation from the prosecution under Meredith that would prevent the
evidence from being linked to the defendant through the testimony of ei-
ther the attorney or his investigator.286 After the attorney turns the evi-
dence over to law enforcement officials or ajudge, the prosecution refers
to stipulate that the evidence will be introduced without the testimony of
the attorney or the investigator, then the attorney should move to with-
draw from the case.287
282. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
285. Seesupra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
286. Such a stipulation would be appropriate in the fact situations in three of the
leading cases, and would protect the attorney-client privilege and assure effective assist-
ance of counsel without detriment to the prosecution's burden of proof. For example, in
Lee, the defendant's neighbor could have testified about where the shoes were found, any
percipient witness could have testified that the shoes belonged to the dEfendant, and the de-
fendant could have been compelled to try on the shoes to prove a proper fit; in Morrell, the
friend could have testified about the pad being found in Morrell's vehicle at his residence;
and in Meredith, the investigator testified on direct examination where the victim's wallet
was found without being identified as an investigator for the defendant's attorney.
287. Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 2-111 (A)(5).
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